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Abstract
We propose a ‘dominant currency paradigm’ with three key features: dominant cur-
rency pricing, pricing complementarities, and imported inputs in production. We test this
paradigm using a new data set of bilateral price and volume indices for more than 2,500
country pairs that covers 91% of world trade, as well as detailed rm-product-country data
for Colombian exports and imports. In strong support of the paradigm we nd that: (1)
Non-commodities terms of trade are uncorrelated with exchange rates. (2) e dollar ex-
change rate quantitatively dominates the bilateral exchange rate in price pass-through and
trade elasticity regressions, and this eect is increasing in the share of imports invoiced in
dollars. (3) U.S. import volumes are signicantly less sensitive to bilateral exchange rates,
compared to other countries’ imports. (4) A 1% U.S. dollar appreciation against all other
currencies predicts a 0.6% decline within a year in the volume of total trade between coun-
tries in the rest of the world, controlling for the global business cycle. We characterize the
transmission of, and spillovers from, monetary policy shocks in this environment.
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Jianlin Wang for excellent research assistance and Enrique Montes and his team at the Banco de la Repu´blica for their
help with the data. e views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of
the IMF, its Executive Board, or management, nor those of the Banco de la Repu´blica or its Board of Directors. Gopinath
acknowledges that this material is based on work supported by the NSF under Grant Number #1061954 and #1628874. Any
opinions, ndings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not
necessarily reect the views of the NSF. All remaining errors are our own.
1 Introduction
Nominal exchange rates have always been at the center of erce economic and political debates on
spillovers, currency wars, and competitiveness. It is easy to understand why: in the presence of price
rigidities, nominal exchange rate uctuations are associated with uctuations in relative prices and
therefore have consequences for real variables such as the trade balance, consumption, and output.
e relationship between nominal exchange rate uctuations and other nominal and real vari-
ables depends critically on the currency in which prices are rigid. e rst generation of New Keyne-
sian (NK) models, the leading paradigm in international macroeconomics, assumes prices are sticky
in the currency of the producing country. Under this ‘producer currency pricing’ paradigm (PCP), the
law of one price holds and a nominal depreciation raises the price of imports relative to exports (the
terms-of-trade) thus improving competitiveness. is paradigm was developed in the seminal con-
tributions of Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962), Svensson and van Wijnbergen (1989), and Obstfeld
and Rogo (1995).
ere is, however, pervasive evidence that the law of one price fails to hold. Out of this ob-
servation grew a second pricing paradigm. In the original works of Bes and Devereux (2000) and
Devereux and Engel (2003), prices are instead assumed to be sticky in the currency of the destination
market. Under this ‘local currency pricing’ paradigm (LCP), a nominal depreciation lowers the price
of imports relative to exports, a decline in the terms-of-trade, thus worsening competitiveness. Both
paradigms have been extensively studied in the literature and are surveyed in Corsei et al. (2010).
Recent empirical work on the currency of invoicing of international prices questions the validity
of both approaches. Firstly, there is very lile evidence that the best description of pricing in inter-
national markets follows either PCP or LCP. Instead, the vast majority of trade is invoiced in a small
number of ‘dominant currencies,’ with the U.S. dollar playing an outsized role. is is documented in
Goldberg and Tille (2008) and in Gopinath (2015). Secondly, exporters price in markets characterized
by strategic complementarities in pricing that give rise to variations in desired mark-ups.1 irdly,
1Burstein and Gopinath (2014) survey the evidence on variable mark-ups.
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most exporting rms employ imported inputs in production, reducing the value added content of
exports.2 e workhorse NK models in the literature a` la Galı´ and Monacelli (2005) instead assume
constant demand elasticity and/or abstract from intermediate inputs.
Based on these observations, this paper proposes an alternative: the ‘dominant currency paradigm’
(DCP). Under DCP, rms set export prices in a dominant currency (most oen the dollar) and change
them infrequently. ey face strategic complementarities in pricing, and there is roundabout pro-
duction using domestic and foreign inputs. We then test this paradigm using a newly constructed
data set of bilateral price and volume indices for more than 2,500 country pairs that covers 91% of
world trade, and a rm level database of the universe of Colombian exports and imports.
According to DCP, the following should hold true: First, at both short and medium horizons the
terms-of-trade should be insensitive to exchange rate uctuations. Second, for non-U.S. countries
exchange rate pass-through into import prices (in home currency) should be high and driven by the
dollar exchange rate as opposed to the bilateral exchange rate. For the U.S., on the contrary, pass-
through into import prices should be low. ird, for non-U.S. countries, import quantities should be
driven by the dollar exchange rate as opposed to the bilateral exchange rate. In addition, U.S. import
quantities should be less responsive to dollar exchange rate movements as compared to non-U.S.
countries. Fourth, when the dollar appreciates uniformly against all other currencies, it should lead
to a decline in trade between countries in the rest of the world (i.e. excluding the U.S.).
e stability of the terms-of-trade under DCP follows from the pricing of imports and exports in
a common currency and the low sensitivity of these prices to ER uctuations. is contrasts with
the predictions of the PCP and LCP paradigms. Under PCP (LCP) the terms-of-trade depreciates (ap-
preciates) almost one-to-one with the exchange rate as the price of imports rise (is stable) alongside
stable (rising) export prices, in home currency. It also diers from predictions of models with exible
2e fact that most exporters are also importers is well documented. See Bernard et al. (2009), Kugler and Verhoogen
(2009), Manova and Zhang (2009) among others. is is also reected in the fact that value added exports are signicantly
lower than gross exports, particularly for manufacturing, as documented in Johnson (2014) and Johnson and Noguera (2012).
Amiti et al. (2014) present empirical evidence of the inuence of strategic complementarities in pricing and of imported
inputs on pricing decisions of Belgian rms.
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prices and strategic complementarities in pricing such as Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Itskhoki
and Mukhin (2017). Unlike these models, the terms-of-trade stability under DCP is associated with
volatile movements of the relative price of imported to domestic goods for non-dominant (currency)
countries. Furthermore, this volatility is driven by uctuations in the value of the country’s currency
relative to the dominant currency, regardless of the country of origin of the imported goods. Conse-
quently, demand for imports depends on the value of a country’s currency relative to the dominant
currency. When a country’s currency depreciates relative to the dominant currency, all else equal, it
reduces its demand for imports from all countries.
In the case of exports, in contrast to PCP, which associates exchange rate depreciations with
increases in quantities exported (controlling for demand), DCP predicts a negligible impact on goods
exported to the dominant-currency destination. For exporting rms whose dominant currency prices
are unchanged there is no increase in exports. For those rms changing prices the rise in marginal
cost following the rise in the price of imported inputs and the complementarities in pricing dampen
their incentive to reduce prices, leaving exports mostly unchanged. e impact on exports to non-
dominant currency destinations depends on the uctuations of the exchange rate of the destination
country currency with the dominant currency. If the exchange rate is stable then DCP predicts a
weak impact on exports to non-dollar destinations. On the other hand, if the destination country
currency weakens (strengthens) relative to the dominant currency it can lead to a decline (increase)
in exports.
Fluctuations in the value of dominant currencies can also have implications for cyclical uctu-
ations in global trade (the sum of exports and imports). Under DCP, a strengthening of dominant
currencies relative to non-dominant ones is associated with a decline in imports across the periphery
without a signicant increase in exports to dominant currency markets, thus negatively impacting
global trade. In contrast, in the case of PCP, the rise in competitiveness for the periphery generates
an increase in exports. Moreover, the increase in exports dampens the decline in imports as produc-
tion relies on imported intermediate inputs. In the case of LCP, both the import and export response
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is muted so the impact on global trade is weak.
We further demonstrate numerically that the dierent paradigms lead to contrasting implications
for the transmission of monetary policy shocks within and across countries. With a Taylor rule, the
ination-output trade-o in response to a monetary policy (MP) shock for a non-dominant currency
worsens under DCP relative to PCP. at is, a monetary policy rate cut raises ination by much
more than it increases output, as compared to PCP. Further, under DCP, contractionary MP shocks
in the dominant country have strong spillovers to MP in the rest-of-the world and reduce rest-of-
world and global trade, while MP shocks in non-dominant currency countries generate only weak
spillovers and have lile impact on world trade.
Our empirical ndings strongly support the predictions of DCP. Using the global database of
bilateral trade price and volume indices we show the following. First, a regression of the bilateral
non-commodities terms of trade on changes in the bilateral exchange rate yields a contemporaneous
coecient on the exchange rate of 0.037, with a 95% condence interval [0.02, 0.05], consistent with
DCP. For comparison, the coecient should be close to 1 under PCP and to −1 under LCP.
For our second nding, we estimate exchange rate pass-through and trade elasticity regressions
at the country-pair level. We rst follow standard practice and estimate the pass-through of bilateral
exchange rates into import prices and volumes.3 We document that when country j’s currency
depreciates relative to country i by 10%, import prices in country j for goods imported from country
i rise by 8%, suggestive of close to complete pass-through at the one year horizon. However, adding
the U.S. dollar exchange rate as an additional explanatory variable and controlling for the global
business cycle with time xed-eects knocks the coecient on the bilateral exchange rate from
0.76 down to 0.16. e coecient on the dollar exchange rate of 0.78 largely dominates that of the
bilateral exchange rate. Moreover, the magnitude of the dollar pass-through is systematically related
to the dollar invoicing shares of countries. Specically, increasing the dollar invoicing share by 10
3is follows naturally from the classic Mundell-Fleming paradigm, according to which the price an importing country
faces (when expressed in the importing country’s currency) uctuates closely with the bilateral exchange rate. Accordingly,
studies of exchange rate pass-through focus on trade-weighted or bilateral exchange rate changes (Goldberg and Kneer,
1997; Burstein and Gopinath, 2014).
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percentage points causes the contemporaneous dollar pass-through to increase by 3.5 percentage
points. Similar to the price regressions, adding the U.S. dollar exchange rate to a bilateral volume
forecasting regression knocks down the coecient on the bilateral exchange rate by a substantial
amount. e contemporaneous volume elasticity for the dollar exchange rate is -0.19, while the
elasticity for the bilateral exchange rate is an order of magnitude smaller at -0.03.
ese pass-through estimates point to a potential misspecication in the standard pass-through
regressions that ignore the role of the dollar. We also show that the dollar’s role as an invoicing
currency is indeed special, as it handily beats the explanatory power of the euro in price and volume
regressions. e data is also consistent with an additional key prediction of the dominant currency
paradigm: U.S. import prices and volumes are signicantly less sensitive to the exchange rate, as
compared to other countries’ imports.
ird, we demonstrate empirically that the strength of the U.S. dollar is a key predictor of rest-
of-world (i.e. excluding the U.S.) trade volume and ination, again controlling for measures of the
global business cycle. We nd that a 1% appreciation of the U.S. dollar relative to all other curren-
cies is associated with a 0.6% contraction in rest-of-world aggregate import volume within the year.
Furthermore, countries with larger dollar import invoicing shares experience higher pass-through
of the dollar exchange rate into consumer and producer price ination.
e global database has the advantage of covering almost all of world trade, but it is not at the rm
level and is only available at an annual frequency. We demonstrate that all our aggregate ndings
hold also when we use rm-level data from Colombia, a small open economy that is representative
of emerging markets in its heavy reliance on dollar invoicing with 98% of exports invoiced in dol-
lars. Using prices and quantities dened at the rm-10-digit product-country (origin or destination)-
quarter (or year) level for manufactured goods (excluding petrochemical and basic metal industries),
we conrm that the U.S. dollar exchange rate knocks down the bilateral exchange rate for price pass
through and trade elasticity of exports and imports to/from non-dollarized economies. Further, we
demonstrate that DCP is able to match the dynamics of price pass-through.
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To further contrast the dierent pricing paradigms, we simulate a model economy that is subject
to commodity price shocks, productivity shocks, and third country exchange rate shocks, all cal-
ibrated to Colombia, and test its ability to match the data. Using a combination of calibration and
estimation, we document that the data strongly rejects PCP and LCP in favor of DCP. We demonstrate
that all features of DCP maer for quantitatively matching the facts, including strategic complemen-
tarities in pricing and imported input use. Under our benchmark DCP specication we nd, in line
with the data, the export pass-through at four quarters to both dollar and non-dollar destinations
to be 65%. Instead, when we shut down strategic complementarities and imported input use, the
predicted pass-through declines by half to 30%.
Related literature. Our paper is related to a relatively small literature that models dollar pricing.
ese include Corsei and Pesenti (2005), Goldberg and Tille (2008), Goldberg and Tille (2009), De-
vereux et al. (2007), Cook and Devereux (2006) and Canzoneri et al. (2013). All of these models, with
the exception of Canzoneri et al. (2013), are eectively static with one-period-ahead price stickiness.
Unlike Canzoneri et al. (2013), we explore a three region world, which is crucial to analyze dierences
between dominant and non-dominant currencies. Goldberg and Tille (2009) explore three regions but
in a static environment. In addition, the dollar pricing literature assumes constant desired mark-ups
and production functions that use only labor.
Our contribution to this literature is two-fold. Firstly, we develop a new Keynesian open economy
model that combines dynamic dominant currency pricing, variable mark-ups and imported input
use in production. We develop testable implications and demonstrate the dierential transmission of
monetary policy shocks across countries. Secondly, we empirically evaluate the dominant currency
paradigm using two novel databases described previously.
Our empirical evidence on the terms of trade is related to Obstfeld and Rogo (2000), who con-
duct one of the earliest tests of the Mundell-Fleming paradigm against the Bes-Devereux-Engel
paradigm. Obstfeld and Rogo (2000) examine the correlation between country-level terms of trade
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and the trade-weighted exchange rate for 21 countries, using quarterly data for 1982-1998. ey
report an average correlation of 0.26, which they interpret as a rejection of local currency pricing.
Even though the correlation is well less than 1, which would lend weak support for producer cur-
rency pricing, they conjecture that the low correlation could be because of the construction of the
trade-weighted exchange rates and/or because their terms of trade measures include commodity
prices. With the help of our globally representative data set, we improve upon Obstfeld and Rogo
(2000) in several dimensions. Specically, we examine the bilateral terms of trade, excluding com-
modity prices and we estimate pass-through coecients as opposed to correlations. Moreover, we
test additional predictions of the dierent pricing paradigms.
Our exchange rate pass-through analysis is among the rst to exploit a globally representative
data set on bilateral trade volumes and values. To our knowledge, the only other work that utilizes a
similarly rich data set is Bussie`re et al. (2016), who analyze trade prices and quantities at the product
level.4
e remaining literature on exchange rate pass-through falls into two main camps. First, many
papers use unilateral (i.e., country-level) time series, which limits the ability to analyze cross-sectional
heterogeneity and necessitates the use of trade-weighted rather than truly bilateral exchange rates
(e.g., Leigh et al., 2015). Second, a recent literature estimates pass-through of bilateral exchange rates
into product-level prices, as opposed to unit values, but these micro data sets are available for only
a few countries (see the review by Burstein and Gopinath, 2014).
e evidence on asymmetric responses of the volume of exports and imports is consistent with
that documented by Alessandria et al. (2013) for exports and Gopinath and Neiman (2014) for im-
ports.5
4e goal of that paper is to quantify the elasticity of prices and quantities to the bilateral exchange rate and check
if Marshall-Lerner conditions hold. In contrast, our goal is to empirically evaluate the predictions of the various pricing
paradigms and in the process highlight the dollar’s central role in global trade.
5e typical explanations for the sluggish export response relies on quantity frictions arising from sunk or search costs
under PCP. DCP, consistent with the data, predicts that such relative prices are stable and therefore, does not require
quantity frictions in the short-term to generate slow adjustments in exports.
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Outline. Section 2 presents the DCP model, proposes testable implications, and contrasts the trans-
mission of monetary policy shocks across pricing paradigms. Section 3 empirically tests the impli-
cations derived in Section 2 using the global database. Section 4 tests and estimates the model using
the Colombian micro data. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Consider an economy j that trades goods and assets with the rest of the world. e nominal bilateral
exchange rate between country j and another country i is denoted Eij , expressed as the price of
currency i in terms of currency j. We assume that the U.S. dollar is the dominant currency and
let E$j denote the price of a U.S. dollar in currency j. An increase in Eij (resp. E$j) represents a
depreciation of country j’s currency against that of country i (resp. the dollar).
As in the canonical open economy framework of Galı´ (2008), rms adjust prices infrequently a`
la Calvo. However, we depart from Galı´ (2008) along four dimensions. First, we nest three dierent
pricing paradigms: producer currency pricing, local currency pricing as well as dominant currency
pricing. Second, the production function uses not just labor but also intermediate inputs produced
domestically and abroad. ird, we allow for strategic complementarity in pricing that gives rise to
variable, as opposed to constant, mark-ups. Last, international asset markets are incomplete with
only risk-less bonds being traded, while Galı´ (2008) assumes complete markets. We describe the
details below.
2.1 Households
Country j is populated with a continuum of symmetric households of measure one. In each period
household h consumes a bundle of traded goodsCj,t(h). Each household also sets a wage rateWj,t(h)
and supplies an individual variety of labor Nj,t(h) in order to satisfy demand at this wage rate.
Households own all domestic rms. To simplify exposition we omit the indexation of households
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when possible. e per-period utility function is separable in consumption and labor and given by,
U(Cj,t, Nj,t) =
1
1− σcC
1−σc
j,t −
κ
1 + ϕ
N1+ϕj,t (1)
where σc > 0 is the household’s coecient of relative risk aversion, ϕ > 0 is the inverse of the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply and κ scales the disutility of labor.
e consumption aggregator Cj,t is implicitly dened by a Kimball (1995) homothetic demand
aggregator: ∑
i
1
|Ωi|
∫
ω∈Ωi
γijΥ
( |Ωi|Cij,t(ω)
γijCj,t
)
dω = 1. (2)
In Eq. (2), Cij,t(ω) represents the consumption by households in country j of variety ω produced by
country i at time t. γij is a set of preference weights that captures home consumption bias in country
j, with
∑
i γij = 1, while |Ωi| is the measure of varieties produced in country i. e function Υ(.)
satises the constraints Υ (1) = 1, Υ′ (.) > 0 and Υ′′ (.) < 0. As is well-known, this demand
structure gives rise to strategic complementarities in pricing and variable mark-ups. It captures the
classic Dornbusch (1987) and Krugman (1987) channel of variable mark-ups and pricing-to-market
as described below.
Households in country j solve the following dynamic optimization problem,
max
Cj,t,Wj,t,B$j,t+1,Bj,t+1(s′)
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Cj,t, Nj,t), (3)
where Et denotes expectations conditional on information available at time t, subject to the per-
period budget constraint expressed in home currency,
Pj,tCj,t + E$j,t(1 + i$j,t−1)B$j,t +Bj,t = Wj,t(h)Nj,t(h) + Πj,t (4)
+E$j,tB$j,t+1 +
∑
s′∈S
Qj,t(s
′)Bj,t+1(s′).
In this expression, Pj,t is the price index for the domestic consumption aggregator Cj,t. Πj,t repre-
sents domestic prots transferred to domestic households, owners of domestic rms. On the nancial
side, households trade a risk-free international bond denominated in dollars that pays a nominal in-
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terest rate i$j,t.6 B$j,t+1 denotes the dollar debt holdings of this bond at time t. ey also have access
to a full set of domestic state contingent securities (in j currency) that are traded domestically and
in zero net supply. Denoting S the set of possible states of the world, Qj,t(s) is the period-t price of
the security that pays one unit of home currency in period t + 1 and state s ∈ S , and Bj,t+1(s) are
the corresponding holdings.
e optimality conditions of the household’s problem yield the following demand system:
Cij,t(ω) = γijψ
(
Dj,t
Pij,t(ω)
Pj,t
)
Cj,t, (5)
where ψ (.) := Υ′−1 (.) > 0 so that ψ′ (.) < 0, Dj,t :=
∑
i
∫
Ωi
Υ′
(
|Ωi|Cij,t(ω)
γijCj,t
)
Cij,t(ω)
Cj,t
dω is a demand
index and Pij,t(ω) denotes the price of variety ω produced in country i and sold in country j, in
currency j. Dene the elasticity of demand σij,t(ω) := −∂ logCij,t(ω)∂ logZij,t(ω) , where Zij,t(ω) := Dj,t
Pij,t(ω)
Pj,t
.
e log of the optimal exible price mark-up is µij,t(ω) := log
(
σij,t
σij,t−1
)
. It is time-varying and we
let Γij,t(ω) := ∂µij,t∂ logZij,t(ω) denote the elasticity of that markup. By denition, the price index Pj,t
satises Pj,tCj,t =
∑
i
∫
Ωi
Pij,t(ω)Cij,t(ω)dω.
Inter-temporal optimality conditions for international and domestic bonds are given by the usual
Euler equations:
C−σcj,t = β(1 + i
$
j,t)Et
[
C−σcj,t+1
Pj,t
Pj,t+1
E$j,t+1
E$j,t
]
(6)
C−σcj,t = β(1 + ij,t)Et
[
C−σcj,t+1
Pj,t
Pj,t+1
]
(7)
where (1 + ij,t) = (
∑
s′∈S Qj,t(s
′))−1 is the inverse of the price of a nominally risk-free j-currency
bond at time t that delivers one unit of j currency in every state of the world in period t+ 1.
Households are subject to a Calvo friction when seing wages in j-currency: in any given period,
they may adjust their wage with probability 1− δw, and maintain the previous-period nominal wage
otherwise. As we will see, they face a downward sloping demand for the specic variety of labor
they supply given by Nj,t(h) =
(
Wj,t(h)
Wj,t
)−ϑ
Nj,t, where ϑ > 1 is the elasticity of labor demand and
6is dollar interest rate can be country specic, hence the dependency on j to reect country risk premia, nancial
frictions or to ensure stationarity of the linearized model.
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Wj,t is the aggregate nominal wage in country j, dened below. e standard optimality condition
for wage seing is given by:
Et
∞∑
s=t
δs−tw Θj,t,sNj,sW
ϑ(1+ϕ)
j,s
[
ϑ
ϑ− 1κPj,sC
σ
j,sN
ϕ
j,s −
W¯j,t(h)
1+ϑϕ
W ϑϕj,s
]
= 0, (8)
where Θj,t,s := βs−t
C−σcj,s
C−σcj,t
Pj,t
Pj,s
is the stochastic discount factor between periods t and s ≥ t used to
discount prots and W¯j,t(h) is the optimal nominal reset wage in period t and country j. is implies
that W¯j,t(h) is preset as a constant mark-up over the expected weighted-average of future marginal
rates of substitution between labor and consumption and aggregate wage rates, during the duration
of the wage. Sticky wages are useful to match the empirical fact that wage-based real exchange rates
move closely with the nominal exchange rates.
2.2 Producers
Each producer in j manufactures a unique variety ω, which is sold both domestically and interna-
tionally. e output of the rm is used both for nal consumption and as an intermediate input for
production. e production function uses a combination of labor Lj,t and intermediate inputs Xj,t,
with a Cobb Douglas production function:
Yj,t = e
aj,tL1−αj,t X
α
j,t (9)
where α is the share of intermediates in production and aj,t is an aggregate productivity shock. e
intermediate input aggregator Xj,t takes the same form as the consumption aggregator in Eq. (2):
∑
i
1
|Ωi|
∫
ω∈Ωi
γijΥ
( |Ωi|Xij,t(ω)
γijXj,t
)
dω = 1, (10)
where Xij,t(ω) represents the demand by rms in country j for variety ω produced in country i as
intermediate input. e labor input Lj,t is a constant elasticity aggregator of the individual varieties
Lj,t(h) supplied by each household, Lj,t =
[∫ 1
0 Lj,t(h)
(ϑ−1)/ϑdh
]ϑ/(ϑ−1)
, with ϑ > 1.
By symmetry, a good produced in j can be used for consumption or as an intermediate input
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in each country i and the demand for domestic individual varieties (both for consumption and as
intermediate input) takes a form similar to that in Eq. (5).
Markets are assumed to be segmented so rms can set dierent prices by destination market and
invoicing currency. Denote P kji,t(ω) the price of a variety ω originating in j, sold in country i and
invoiced in currency k. e per-period nominal prots of the domestic rm producing variety ω are
then given by:
Πj,t(ω) =
∑
i,k
Ekj,tP kji,t(ω)Y kji,t(ω)−MCj,t Yj,t(ω) (11)
with the convention that Ejj,t := 1. In that expression, Y kji,t(ω) = Ckji,t(ω) +Xkji,t(ω) is the demand
for domestic variety ω from country j invoiced in currency k in country i, both for consumption
and as an input in production, while Yj,t(ω) =
∑
i,k Y
k
ji,t(ω) is the total demand across destination
markets i and invoicing currencies k. MCj,t denotes the nominal marginal cost of country j rms
in their home currency. Given Eq. (9), it is given by:
MCj,t = 1
αα(1− α)1−α ·
W 1−αj,t P
α
j,t
eaj,t
. (12)
e optimality conditions for hiring labor are given by,
(1− α)Yj,t
Lj,t
=
Wj,t
MCj,t , Lj,t(h) =
(
Wj,t(h)
Wj,t
)−ϑ
Lj,t, (13)
with the aggregate nominal wage Wj,t dened as Wj,t =
[∫
Wj,t(h)
1−ϑdh
] 1
1−ϑ , while the demand
for intermediate inputs is determined by,
α
Yj,t
Xj,t
=
Pj,t
MCj,t , Xij,t(ω) = γijψ
(
Dj,t
Pij,t(ω)
Pj,t
)
Xj,t. (14)
2.3 Pricing
Firms choose prices at which to sell in j and in international markets i, with prices reset infrequently.
As in Galı´ (2008), we consider a Calvo pricing environment where rms are randomly allowed to reset
prices with probability 1 − δp. A core focus of this paper is on the implications of various pricing
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choices by rms, in particular under dominant currency pricing. Consequently, we assume that
rms can set their prices either in the producer currency (j), in the destination currency (i), or in the
dominant currency ($).
Denote θkji the fraction of exports from region j to region i that are priced in currency k, with∑
k θ
k
ji = 1 for any pair {i, j}. We allow for all pricing combinations but will focus on subsets.
e benchmark of PCP corresponds to the case where θjj,i = 1 for every i 6= j. e case of LCP
corresponds to θiji = 1 for every i 6= j. Under DCP, θ$ji = 1 for every i 6= j. Lastly, we assume that
all domestic prices are sticky in the home currency, an assumption consistent with a large body of
evidence: θjjj = 1 for every j.
Consider the pricing problem of a rm from country j selling in country i and invoicing in cur-
rency k, and denote P¯ kji,t(ω) its reset price. is reset price satises the following optimality condi-
tion:
Et
∞∑
s=t
δs−tp Θj,t,sY
k
ji,s|t(ω)(σ
k
ji,s(ω)− 1)
(
Ekj,sP¯ kji,t(ω)−
σkji,s(ω)
σkji,s(ω)− 1
MCj,s
)
= 0. (15)
In this expression, Y kji,s|t(ω) is the quantity sold in country i invoiced in currency k at time s by a
rm that resets prices at time t ≤ s and σkji,s(ω) is the elasticity of demand. is expression im-
plies that P¯ kji,t(ω) is preset as a markup over expected future marginal costs expressed in currency k,
MCj,s(ω)/Ekj,s, over the duration of the price spell. Observe that because of strategic complemen-
tarities, the mark-up over expected future marginal costs is not constant.
2.4 Testable Implications
Before we close the model, we can already outline a number of testable implications of our framework
for the joint behavior of exchange rates, export and import prices, and quantities. We explore them
empirically in Section 3.
Using lower cases to denote the log of variables (e.g., pij = lnPij), country j’s import price
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ination for goods originating from country i can be expressed as:
∆pij,t =
∑
k
θkij
(
∆pkij,t + ∆ekj,t
)
,
where the summation is over invoicing currencies. Under Calvo pricing, ∆pkij,t = (1−δp)
(
p¯kij,t − pkij,t−1
)
,
and p¯kij,t is the (log) reset-price dened in Eq. (15). If all goods from i to j are either producer-priced
(PCP), locally-priced (LCP) or priced in the dominant currency (DCP), θiij + θ
j
ij + θ
$
ij = 1 and we
obtain:
∆pij,t = θ
i
ij∆eij,t + θ
$
ij∆e$j,t + (1− δp)
∑
k
θkij
(
p¯kij,t − pkij,t−1
)
. (16)
In the very short run, δp → 1, and we can ignore the last term of the previous equation: changes
in bilateral import prices and in the bilateral terms of trade TOTij = Pij/(PjiEij) only depend on
the bilateral nominal exchange rates, the dollar exchange rate, and the share of trade invoiced in
dierent currencies.
On the quantity side a log-linear approximation (around a symmetric steady state) of Eqs. (5)
and (14) yields,
∆yij,t = −σij (∆pij,t −∆pj,t) + ∆ydj,t,
where σij is the elasticity of demand and ydj,t is the (log) of aggregate demand in country j.
Proposition 1 (pass-through). When prices are fully rigid and pre-determined in their currency of in-
voicing (δp → 1), pass-through into bilateral import prices expressed in currency j and quantities from
country i to country j (controlling for destination prices pj,t and demand ydj,t) are given by:
∆pij,t = θ
i
ij∆eij,t + θ
$
ij∆e$j,t (17)
∆yij,t = −σij
(
θiij∆eij,t + θ
$
ij∆e$j,t
)
(18)
• In the case of PCP, θiij = θ
j
ji = 1 and
∆pij,t = ∆eij,t, ∆pji,t = −∆eij,t
∆totij,t = ∆pij,t − (∆pji,t + ∆eij,t) = ∆eij,t.
∆yij,t = −σij∆eij,t
14
• In the case of LCP, θjij = θ
i
ji = 1 and
∆pij,t = 0, ∆pji,t = 0
∆totij,t = ∆pij,t − (∆pji,t + ∆eij,t) = −∆eij,t
∆yij,t = 0.
• In the case of DCP, θ$ij = θ
$
ji = 1 and
∆pij,t = ∆e$j,t, ∆pji,t = ∆e$i,t
∆totij,t = ∆pij,t − (∆pji,t + ∆eij,t) = 0
∆yij,t = −σij,t∆e$j,t.
It should be clear that the predictions for prices, when prices are yet to change, do not depend
on what drives the exchange rate variation, that is, whether it arises from monetary policy shocks,
nancial shocks or other shocks. Empirically, we should expect those countries relying more heavily
on dollar pricing to display greater sensitivity to the dollar exchange rate, even when controlling for
the bilateral exchange rate between countries i and j.7 We summarize the testable implications of
DCP below.
Testable Implications. (Import Price and antity Pass-rough)
1. e bilateral terms of trade should be insensitive to bilateral exchange rates.
2. For non-U.S. countries exchange rate pass-through into import prices (in home currency) should be
high and driven by the dollar exchange rate as opposed to the bilateral exchange rate. Countries
that rely more heavily on dollar import invoicing should see more of this eect. For the U.S., on
the contrary, pass-through into import prices should be low.
3. For non-U.S. countries, import quantities should be driven by the dollar exchange rate as opposed
to the bilateral exchange rate. U.S. import quantities should be less responsive to dollar exchange
rate movements as compared to non-U.S. countries.
7Note that if the source of the shock generates co-movement across exchange rates, the resulting collinearity would
show up in the regressions as large standard errors around the point estimates on each bilateral exchange rate. As we
report below, this is not an issue.
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4. When all countries’ currencies uniformly depreciate relative to the dollar, it should lead to a decline
in trade between the rest of the world (i.e. excluding the U.S.).
e rst three implications follow directly from Proposition 1. e last implication is obtained
from the aggregation of import volumes across country-pairs where the U.S. is neither the origin nor
the destination country. Denote R the set of such country-pairs: R ≡ {(i, j), i 6= j, i 6= $, j 6= $}.
Let ωij denote country j total non-commodity import value from country i in some reference year,
normalized so that
∑
R ωij = 1. We conceptualize the rest-of-the-world aggregate trade bundle,
yR,t, as a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of individual-country bilateral (log) gross imports with weights
ωij : yR,t :=
∑
R ωijyij,t. Ceteris paribus, under DCP, a uniform depreciation relative to the dollar
∆e$,t > 0, leads to a decline in non-commodity trade in the rest of the world:
∆yR,t =
∑
R
ωij∆yij,t = −
(∑
R
ωijσij,t
)
∆e$,t < 0. (19)
Under either PCP or LCP, the growth of the rest-of-the-world trade is instead ∆yR,t = 0, either be-
cause bilateral non-dollar exchange rates are unchanged (under PCP) or because there is no bilateral
pass-through (LCP).
As the horizon increases, the frequency of price adjustment increases and the pass-through pre-
dictions depend also on the response of reset prices p¯kij,t to exchange rates. We demonstrate in Sec-
tion 4.2 that the divergent predictions across the dierent paradigms hold at longer than annual
frequencies in the presence of strategic complementarities in pricing and imported input use.8
8is result does not depend on the exogeneity of the currency of invoicing. Some of the ingredients from our model,
namely imported input use in production and strategic complementarities in pricing, are precisely those that would give
rise endogenously to dominant currency in pricing. is is demonstrated by Gopinath et al. (2010) in a partial equilibrium
environment and Mukhin (2018) in a general equilibrium environment. Nonetheless, our testable predictions continue to
hold, even aer endogenizing the currency choice: as shown in Gopinath et al. (2010), rms choose to price in currencies
in which their reset prices are most stable, i.e., desired medium-run pass-through into the price (expressed in the invoicing
currency) is low. In other words, our empirical ndings will continue to be relevant in an environment with endogenous
currency choice.
Lastly, as the horizon increases the impact of exchange rate uctuations on prices and quantities depend on the source of
the shock. e ideal test would be to examine the joint response of exchange rates, prices, and quantities to an exogenous
shock such as a monetary policy shock. e problem is that in the data exchange rate uctuations have lile to do with
monetary policy shocks or other identied policy shocks. Instead exchange rates appear to be driven by a ‘residual’ that the
literature names ‘nancial shocks.’ Practically this shows up as low power in testing the channel from identied exogenous
shocks to exchange rates and to trade.
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2.5 Closing the Model and Contrasting Shock Transmission
Before turning to our empirical results, this subsection demonstrates the dierential transmission of
monetary policy (MP) shocks across dierent pricing paradigms in a Small Open Economy (SOE).
en, using a 3-country Large Open Economy (LOE) framework, it further documents the asymmetry
in monetary policy spillovers under DCP, depending on whether the MP shocks originate in the
dominant currency country or elsewhere. We show that when countries follow a Taylor rule: (i) e
ination-output trade-o in response to a monetary policy shock for a small open economy worsens
under DCP relative to PCP. (ii) MP shocks in the dominant country have strong spillovers to MP in
the rest-of-the world and reduce rest-of-world and global trade, while MP shocks in non-dominant
currency countries generate only weak spillovers and lile impact on world trade. Details of the
simulations are provided in an online appendix.
2.5.1 Closing the Model
To evaluate shock transmission, we need to close the model. is requires that in addition to the
equilibrium conditions specied in Section 2 we spell out the processes for interest rates and impose
market clearing conditions. We assume that the nominal interest rate in each country i is set by its
monetary authority and follows a Taylor rule with inertia:
ii,t − i∗ = ρm(ii,t−1 − i∗) + (1− ρm) (φMpii,t + φY y˜i,t) + εi,t.
In this expression, φM captures the sensitivity of policy rates to consumer price ination pii,t =
∆ lnPi,t, φY measures the sensitivity to the output gap y˜i,t, ρm captures the inertia in seing policy
rates, while the target nominal interest rate is assumed equal to the steady state international bor-
rowing rate i∗. εi,t evolves according to an AR(1) process, εi,t = ρεεi,t−1 + mi,t where mi,t are serially
independently distributed innovations.9
9In Section 4.2 we examine moments of the stationary distribution for a small open economy. As is well known, in
the absence of further assumptions the SOE model just described when solved around a well behaved steady state with
β(1 + i∗) = 1 is non-stationary in that the level of real debt and therefore other real variables are permanently changed
even in response to transitory shocks. To induce stationarity we follow Schmi-Grohe and Uribe (2003) and assume the
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Goods, labor and domestic bond market-clearing conditions requireYi,t(ω) =
∑
j (Cij,t(ω) +Xij,t(ω)),
Ni,t = Li,t, and Bi,t(s′) = 0,∀s′ ∈ S . e remaining market clearing conditions depend on whether
we consider a small open economy (SOE) or a large open economy (LOE) environment. In the SOE
case, all foreign variables are taken as exogenous and not impacted by shocks in the SOE. In the LOE
case, we impose the additional requirement that
∑
j B
$
j,t = 0.
2.5.2 Calibration
Preference aggregator. We adopt the Klenow and Willis (2016) functional form for the demand
function Υ(.). is gives rise to the following demand for individual varieties:
Yij,t(ω) ≡ Cij,t(ω) +Xij,t(ω) = γi
(
1 +  ln
σ − 1
σ
−  lnZij,t(ω)
)σ/
(Cj,t +Xj,t)
where Zij,t(ω) ≡ Dj,t Pij,t(ω)Pj,t as previously dened and σ and  are two parameters that determine
the elasticity of demand and its variability as follows:
σij,t(ω) =
σ(
1 +  ln σ−1σ −  lnZij,t(ω)
) , Γij,t(ω) = (
σ − 1−  ln σ−1σ +  lnZij,t(ω)
)
.
In a symmetric steady state Zij,t(ω) = (σ− 1)/σ, the elasticity of demand is σ while the elasticity of
the mark-up is Γ = /(σ − 1). Strategic complementarities and variable markups arise when  > 0,
while  = 0 corresponds to the constant elasticity case.
Parameter values. Table 1 lists parameter values employed in the simulation. e time period is a
quarter. Several parameters are set to values standard in the literature (see e.g., Galı´, 2008). Following
Christiano et al. (2011) we set the wage stickiness parameter δw = 0.85 corresponding roughly to a
year and a half average duration of wages. e steady state elasticity of substitution between varieties
dollar interest rate in country i 6= $ is an increasing function of its external debt, i$i,t = i$,t +ψ(e(B
$
i,t+1/P$)−B¯$i − 1) + $i,t,
where ψ > 0 measures the responsiveness of the dollar rate to the country’s real dollar debt holdings B$i,t+1/P$ where
P$ is exogenous from the SOE perspective. B¯$i is the exogenous steady-state real dollar debt holdings. is is a standard
assumption in the small open economy literature to induce stationarity in a log-linearized environment. Because of the
dependence on aggregate debt individual households do not internalize the eect of their borrowing choices on the interest
rate. In this section we study the impulse response to a small one time shock and consequently the model with or without
the stationarity assumption delivers almost identical results, as also shown by Schmi-Grohe and Uribe (2003).
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Parameter values for calibrated model
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Household Preferences Demand
Discount factor β 0.99 Elasticity σ 2.00
Risk aversion σc 2.00 Super-elasticity  1.00
Frisch elasticity of N ϕ−1 0.50 Home-bias γ 0.70
Disutility of labor κ 1.00 Rigidities
Labor demand elasticity ϑ 4.00 Wage δw 0.85
Steady state NFA B¯$ 0 Price δp 0.75
Production Monetary Rule
Intermediate share α 2/3 Inertia ρm 0.50
(log) Productivity a 1 Ination sensitivity φM 1.5
Output gap sensitivity φY 0.50/4
Shock persistence ρε 0.50
SS. interest rate i∗ (1/β)− 1
Table 1: Parameter values for calibrated model.
σ is assumed in the model to be the same across and within regions. Accordingly, we calibrate to
an average of these elasticities measured in the literature. Specically, Broda and Weinstein (2006)
obtain a median elasticity estimate of 2.9 for substitution across imported varieties, while Feenstra
et al. (2010) estimate a value close to 1 for the elasticity of substitution across domestic and foreign
varieties. us, we set σ = 2.
To parameterize , which controls the strength of the strategic complementarities, we rely on
estimates from the micro pass-through literature that converges on very similar values for Γ despite
the dierences in data and methodology. Following Amiti et al. (2016), Amiti et al. (2014), Gopinath
and Itskhoki (2010) we set Γ = 1. Because in steady state Γ = /(σ−1) this implies  = 1. e home
bias share is set to 0.7. is implies steady-state spending on imported goods in the consumption
bundle and intermediate input bundle equal to thirty percent.10
2.5.3 Small Open Economy
In this section we contrast the impulse responses to a monetary policy shock in a SOE (labeled H)
under dierent pricing regimes. Fig. 1 plots the impulse response to a 25 basis point exogenous cut in
10For the SOE case we assume exogenous rest-of-the world demand such that exports as a ratio of GDP is 45%. e
specic value of this ratio is not essential to the results.
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domestic interest rates (Fig. 1(a)). In each sub-gure, we contrast the response under three regimes:
Dominant Currency Paradigm (DCP), Producer Currency Pricing (PCP), and Local Currency pricing
(LCP).
Exchange rate and ination. Following the monetary shock, domestic interest rates decline but
less than one-to-one as the exchange rate E$H depreciates by around 0.8% (Fig. 1(c)) raising ination-
ary pressures on the economy (Fig. 1(b)). is in turn dampens the fall in nominal interest rates via
the monetary policy rule. As seen in Fig. 1(b) the increase in ination in the case of DCP and PCP far
exceeds that of LCP since exchange rate movements have a smaller impact on the domestic prices of
imported goods when import prices are sticky in local currency.
Terms-of-trade. e exchange rate depreciation is associated with almost a one-to-one depreci-
ation of the terms-of-trade in the case of PCP and a one-to-one appreciation in the case of LCP
(Fig. 1(d)). In contrast, under DCP, the terms-of-trade depreciate negligibly and remain stable be-
cause both export and import prices are stable in the dominant currency.
Exports and imports. With stable export and import prices in the dominant currency under DCP,
the home currency price of exports and imports rises with the exchange rate depreciation as depicted
in Figs. 1(e) and 1(f). is in turn generates a signicant decline in trade-weighted imports (0.43%),
despite the expansionary eect of monetary policy, and only a modest increase in trade-weighted
exports (0.1%) (Figs. 1(g) and 1(h)). is contrasts with the PCP benchmark that generates a large
increase in exports and with the LCP benchmark that generates an increase in imports (from the
demand expansion). e decline in imports in the case of PCP is lower than that under DCP because
of export expansion under PCP and the use of imported inputs.
Output. As depicted in Fig. 1(i) the expansionary impact on output is muted under DCP relative to
PCP, with the lowest impact under LCP. Under DCP, there is an expenditure switching eect from
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Figure 1: Impulse response to a monetary policy shock in a SOE
imports towards domestic output that is absent under LCP, while DCP misses out on the expansion-
ary impact on exports under PCP. Comparing Figs. 1(b) and 1(i), the ination-output trade-o in
response to expansionary monetary policy worsens under DCP relative to both PCP and LCP (where
output does not expand much, but ination increases the least). In the case of DCP, ination rises by
0.35% on impact and output by 0.56%, a ratio of 0.4. In the case of PCP, that ratio is almost halved to
0.2/0.8 = 0.25. e ratio is lowest for LCP at 0.07.
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2.5.4 Large Open Economies
For the LOE case we consider three economies, U , G and R. ese economies are symmetric, except
for international pricing and bond markets in which the the dollar (the currency of U ) is dominant.11
Assuming 100% dollar pricing in international trade, we focus on the asymmetry in the transmission
of monetary policy shocks that originate in U , relative to those in G/R.
Monetary policy shock in dominant currency country. We rst consider a positive 25 basis point
shock to the nominal interest rate in U . e impulse responses to this monetary tightening are ploed
in Fig. 2. e outcomes in G and R are the same for all variables, including their exchange rates,
both of which depreciate by 0.65% relative to the dollar on impact.
e rise in interest rates in U leads to a decline in output (-0.6%, Figure 2(e)), an appreciation
of the dollar (0.65%, Figure 2(c)), and a fall in ination (-0.02%, Fig. 2(d)). e decline in ination is,
however, negligible (in contrast to PCP) because dollar pricing generates a low pass-through of the
dollar appreciation into the price of imported goods, as seen in Fig. 2(g). On the other hand, the
pass-through into export prices (in the destination currency) is high, as depicted in Fig. 2(h), which
in turn generates a signicant decline in exports (Fig. 2(i)). Imports decline because of the decline
in overall demand given MP tightening so overall, the trade balance to GDP deteriorates mildly. e
terms of trade (Fig. 2(f)) are largely unchanged.
e monetary tightening in U has a larger eect on ination on impact in G/R (0.2%, Fig. 2(d))
than in U because the depreciation has high pass-through into import prices of the former countries.
is in turn generates an endogenous increase in interest rates (0.15%, Fig. 2(b)) inG/R via the Taylor
rule, leading to a mild contraction in output (-0.03%, Fig. 2(e)). Despite the depreciation of the G/R
exchange rates relative to the dollar, their exports to U decline (-0.4%, Fig. 2(j)) because dollar prices
11We simulate the model also for the case when there is a full set of Arrow-Debreu securities traded. e impulse re-
sponses, qualitatively and quantitatively, are very close. is is intuitive because under perfect foresight, the noncontingent
bond is sucient to complete the market, i.e., the equilibrium conditions of the cases with complete markets and incomplete
markets with a bond are the same. When an unanticipated shock hits, only the initial period’s equilibrium conditions dier
across the two cases.
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to U change by lile so there is no signicant positive expenditure switching eect, and the decline
in overall demand in U generates a decline in exports to U . Also, because of dollar pricing, there is a
sharp decline in exports fromG toR (-0.85%, Fig. 2(j)) and vice versa. is is because the depreciation
of these countries’ currencies relative to the dollar makes all imports more expensive, leading to a
switch in expenditures away from imported goods. is is then further accentuated by the (mild)
negative impact on consumption from the rise in interest rates in response to the inationary eect.
As follows from the previous discussion, a monetary tightening in U and the accompanying
uniform appreciation of the dollar relative to other countries generate a decline in rest-of-world
trade (-0.83%, Fig. 2(k)), dened as the sum of quantities traded between G and R. It also causes a
decline in global trade (-0.73%, Fig. 2(l)), dened as the sum of export quantities from all countries.
Monetary policy shock in non-dominant currency country. We next consider a 25 basis point
monetary tightening in a non-dominant currency country. Without loss of generality, we set this to be
G. As depicted in Fig. 3(c), G’s currency appreciates uniformly relative to U and R on impact, and
by a magnitude similar to that in Fig. 2(c). is is because, despite the endogenous change in interest
rates in each country (Fig. 3(b) diers from Fig. 2(b)), the change in the interest rate dierential
between countries is quite similar, which is what maers for the exchange rate change.
e transmission of the shock to interest rates inG (Fig. 3(b)) is partly muted because the decline
in ination is endogenously contained through the Taylor rule. e negative impact on ination of
-0.2% (Fig. 3(d)) contrasts with the much smaller eect of a MP shock in U on U ’s ination (Fig. 2(d)).
is dierential response arises from the strong pass-through of the appreciation of G’s currency
into its import prices. e rise in interest rates in G leads to a decline in output (-0.6%, Fig. 3(e)).
While pass-through into import prices (in G’s currency) is high (-0.6%, Fig. 3(h)), pass-through into
export prices (in destination currency) is low. Consequently, there is only a small negative impact
on exports from G (-0.05%, Fig. 3(j)), in contrast to the large negative impact of a MP tightening in U
on U ’s exports (Fig. 2(i)). While exports are not responsive, there is a signicant increase in imports
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a 25 basis point monetary tightening in U . Rest-of-world trade is dened as
the sum of quantities traded between G and R. World trade is dened as the sum of export quantities from all
countries.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a 25 basis point monetary tightening in G. Rest-of-world trade is dened as
the sum of quantities traded between U and R. World trade is dened as the sum of export quantities from all
countries.
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intoG from U , andR through the expenditure switching channel following the depreciation of their
currencies relative to G’s (Fig. 3(i)). e terms of trade are stable, as in the case of the MP shock in
U (Fig. 3(g)).
Since exports from U and R to G increase signicantly, while exports out of G decline only
marginally, the monetary tightening in G is associated with an expansion in global trade (Fig. 3(l)),
and almost no eect on rest-of-world trade (gross trade between U and R, Fig. 3(k)).
3 Global Empirical Evidence
is section tests the model predictions derived in Section 2.4, using bilateral trade volumes and unit
values for a large number of countries. We show that, consistent with DCP, the U.S. dollar plays an
outsized role in driving international trade prices and quantities. We rst document that bilateral
terms of trade are essentially uncorrelated with bilateral exchange rates. Next, we demonstrate that
the bilateral (importer vs. exporter) exchange rates maer less than the exchange rate vis-a`-vis the
U.S. dollar for pass-through and trade elasticities of the average country in our sample. We also nd
the euro to be much less important than the dollar. e eects of the dollar are stronger when the
importing country has a higher fraction of trade invoiced in dollars. e dollar’s role is greatest
for trade between emerging market pairs, consistent with their higher reliance on dollar pricing.
Finally, we show that the overall strength of the U.S. dollar is a key predictor of gross trade and
producer/consumer price ination in the rest of the world.
3.1 Data
e core of our data set consists of panel data on bilateral trade values and volumes from Comtrade.
UN Comtrade provides detailed annual customs data for a large set of countries at the HS 6-digit
product level with information about the destination country, dollar value, quantity, and weight of
imports and exports. is dataset makes it possible to compute volume changes over time for each
product, and use the value data to infer unit values. Once unit values are calculated, we compute
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chained Fisher price indices to aggregate up from the product level to the bilateral country level.
We focus entirely on data for non-commodity goods, except noted otherwise. Given the inherent
diculty in drawing a line between commodities and non-commodities, we dene commodities fairly
broadly as HS chapters 1–27 and 72–83, which comprise animal, vegetable, food, mineral, and metal
products.
e biggest challenge for constructing price and volume indices using customs data is the so-
called unit value bias. Unit values, calculated by dividing observed values by quantities, are not
actual prices. Even when there is no price change, unit values can change due to compositional
shis. To take a stab at correcting for this bias, we follow the methodology developed by Boz et al.
(2019). Specically, we eliminate 6-digit products with a unit value variance higher than a threshold
as those observations are more likely to be biased. To check whether this provides a sucient x,
we compare our Comtrade estimated price indices with those reported by the BLS based on actual
import prices for the U.S. We nd that our indices track the BLS import price indices fairly well.
Results of this comparison, further details of Comtrade data construction as well as sources of other
macroeconomic data are provided in the online appendix A.1.
3.2 Terms of Trade and Exchange Rates
We rst relate bilateral terms of trade to bilateral exchange rates using panel regressions (testable
implication 1). In this subsection, a cross-sectional unit is dened to be an unordered country pair,
so that both trade ows between two countries i and j are associated with the cross-sectional unit
{i, j}. Recall that pij denotes the (log) price of goods exported from country i to country j measured
in currency j, eij the (log) bilateral exchange rate between country i and country j expressed as the
price of currency i in terms of currency j and totij = pij − pji− eij the (log) bilateral terms of trade,
dened as the ratio of import prices to export prices (measured in the same currency). Moreover, let
ppiij denote the (log) ratio of the producer price index (PPI) in country i divided by PPI in country
j, with indices expressed in the same currency.
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Terms of trade and exchange rates
unweighted trade-weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆totij,t ∆totij,t ∆totij,t ∆totij,t
∆eij,t 0.0369*** -0.00938 0.0813*** 0.0218
(0.00863) (0.0130) (0.0235) (0.0317)
PPI no yes no yes
R-squared 0.008 0.011 0.028 0.042
Observations 24,270 19,847 24,270 19,847
Dyads 1,347 1,200 1,347 1,200
Table 2: e rst (resp., last) two columns use unweighted (resp. trade-weighted) regressions. All regressions
include two ∆ER lags and time FE. S.e. clustered by dyad. e number of dyads is about half that in Table 3 since
here the two ordered country tuples (i, j) and (j, i) are collapsed into one cross-sectional unit {i, j}. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
We consider regressions of the following form:
∆totij,t = λij + δt +
2∑
k=0
βk∆eij,t−k +
2∑
k=0
θk∆ppiij,t−k + εij,t, (20)
where λij and δt are dyad (i.e., country pair) and time xed eects. Regression Eq. (20) relates the
growth rate of the bilateral terms of trade to the growth rate of the bilateral nominal exchange
rate (and lags). As discussed in Section 2.4, if exporting rms set prices in their local currencies as
in PCP and prices are sticky, the contemporaneous exchange rate coecient β0 should equal 1. If
instead exporting rms set prices in the destination currency as in LCP and prices are sticky, the
contemporaneous exchange rate coecient should be −1. If most prices are invoiced in U.S. dollars
and are sticky in nominal terms, the coecients βk should be close to zero. As indicated in Eq. (20),
some of our specications control for lags 0–2 of the growth rate of the ratio of PPI in both countries,
since rms’ optimal reset prices should uctuate with domestic cost conditions.
We consider both unweighted and trade-weighted regressions. To obtain trade weights, for each
dyad and year, we compute the share of world non-commodities trade value (in dollars) aributable
to that dyad. en, for each dyad, we compute the average share across the years 1992–2015.
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In line with DCP, we nd that bilateral exchange rates are virtually uncorrelated with bilateral
terms of trade. e results of the panel regressions are shown in Table 2. If we do not control for
relative PPI, the regression results indicate that the contemporaneous eect of the exchange rate
on the terms of trade is positive. While the sign is consistent with PCP, the magnitude is not, as
the 95% condence interval equals [0.02, 0.05] in the unweighted regression, and [0.04 , 0.13] in
the weighted regression.12 e coecients on the lags (not reported) are also small in magnitude.
When controlling for relative PPI, the point estimates of the coecients on the bilateral exchange
rate shrink further toward zero, and condence intervals remain narrow. Hence, our results lend
strong support to DCP: the terms of trade are unresponsive to bilateral exchange rates.
Although the lack of correlation could in principle be consistent with a world of 50% PCP and
50% LCP, the next subsections refute that possibility. In addition, while the lack of correlation is
consistent with any currency being a dominant currency, we provide evidence next that the major
dominant currency is indeed the dollar. e stability of the terms of trade for the average country
in our sample cannot be explained by a model with exible prices and strategic complementarities
in pricing as in Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Itskhoki and Mukhin (2017) because, as we show
next, the import pass-through into destination country prices at-the-dock is high, while that into
consumer or producer prices, reported in online appendix A.2.2, is an order of magnitude smaller,
contrary to the presence of strong complementarities in pricing.
Lastly, online appendix A.2.1 demonstrates that the terms of trade are nearly uncorrelated with
the bilateral exchange rate across all advanced/emerging economy trade ows.
3.3 Exchange Rate Pass-through Into Prices
Next, we relate international prices and exchange rates (testable implication 2). Exchange rate pass-
through regressions are reduced-form regressions that relate price changes to exchange rate changes
and other control variables relevant for pricing. We follow the literature and estimate the standard
12Aenuation bias is not a worry in this context, since the explanatory variables of interest (exchange rates) are precisely
measured, except perhaps for time aggregation issues at the annual frequency.
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pass-through regression as described in Burstein and Gopinath (2014). In the rest of this section, the
cross-sectional unit is an ordered country pair (i, j). We estimate
∆pij,t =λij + δt +
2∑
k=0
βk∆eij,t−k +
2∑
k=0
β$k∆e$j,t−k (21)
+
2∑
k=0
ηk∆eij,t−k × Sj +
2∑
k=0
η$k∆e$j,t−k × Sj + θ′Xi,t + εij,t,
where λij and δt are dyadic and time xed eects. Xi,t are other country i controls, namely the
change in the (log) producer price index of the exporting country i measured in currency i (and two
lags).13 We have modied the textbook pass-through regression by including the dollar exchange
rate, i.e., the log price e$j of a U.S. dollar in currency j, alongside the bilateral exchange rate, as
suggested in Section 2.4. Lastly, we interact the bilateral and dollar exchange rates with the importing
country’s dollar invoicing share Sj . We consider dierent versions of this general specication,
omiing dollar exchange rates and/or interaction terms.
As a benchmark, the estimates from bilateral pass-through regressions on bilateral exchange rates
(i.e., omiing the dollar exchange rates and interaction terms) are reported in columns (1) and (4) of
Table 3. e two columns correspond to unweighted and trade-weighted regressions, respectively.14
According to the regression estimates, when country j’s currency depreciates relative to country i
by 10%, import prices in country j rise by 8%, suggestive of close to complete pass-through at the
one year horizon.15 e second and third lags (not reported) are economically less important.
Columns (2) and (5) report estimates from regressions that include the dollar exchange rate in
addition to the bilateral one. Including the dollar exchange rate sharply reduces the relevance of the
bilateral exchange rate. It knocks the coecient on the bilateral exchange rate from 0.76 to 0.16 in
the unweighted regression, and from 0.77 to 0.34 in the weighted regression. Instead, almost all of
13Online appendix A.2.5 shows that our results are robust to adding importer PPI and GDP growth as additional control
variables.
14Henceforth, the trade weights are given by the average (across the years 1992–2015) share of world non-commodities
trade value aributable to an ordered dyad (i, j).
15With year xed eects this should be interpreted as uctuations in excess of world annual uctuations.
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Exchange rate pass-through into prices
unweighted trade-weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆pij,t ∆pij,t ∆pij,t ∆pij,t ∆pij,t ∆pij,t
∆eij,t 0.757*** 0.164*** 0.209*** 0.765*** 0.345*** 0.445***
(0.0132) (0.0126) (0.0169) (0.0395) (0.0449) (0.0336)
∆eij,t × Sj -0.0841*** -0.253***
(0.0240) (0.0482)
∆e$j,t 0.781*** 0.565*** 0.582*** 0.120*
(0.0143) (0.0283) (0.0377) (0.0622)
∆e$j,t × Sj 0.348*** 0.756***
(0.0326) (0.0796)
R-squared 0.356 0.398 0.515 0.339 0.371 0.644
Observations 46,820 46,820 34,513 46,820 46,820 34,513
Dyads 2,647 2,647 1,900 2,647 2,647 1,900
Table 3: e rst (resp., last) three columns use unweighted (resp. trade-weighted) regressions. All regressions
include two ∆ER lags, lags 0–2 of exporter ∆PPI, and time FE. S.e. clustered by dyad. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
the eect is absorbed by the dollar exchange rate.16 Notice that, due to our inclusion of time xed
eects, the apparent dominance of the dollar cannot be an artifact of special conditions that may
apply in times when the dollar appreciates or depreciates against all other currencies, for example
due to global recessions or ight to safety in asset markets. Online appendix A.2.5 shows that our
results are robust to the choice of time sample, including removing the post-2008 period.
e cross-dyad heterogeneity in pass-through coecients is related to the propensity to invoice
imports in dollars. Columns (3) and (6) interact the dollar and bilateral exchange rates with the share
of invoicing in dollars at the importer country level, as in regression Eq. (21). Notice that we do
not have data on the fraction of bilateral trade invoiced in dollars, so we use the importer’s country-
level share as a proxy. As expected, the import invoicing share plays an economically and statistically
16In the literature, unilateral exchange rate pass-through is sometimes estimated using a Vector Error Correction Model
(VECM) that allows for cointegration between price levels and exchange rates. However, Burstein and Gopinath (2014, p.
403) nd VECM results to be highly unstable across specications, and this issue is likely to be compounded by measurement
error in our bilateral data.
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signicant role for the dollar pass-through. Depending on whether we use trade weights or not, the
regression results indicate that increasing the dollar invoicing share by 10 percentage points causes
the contemporaneous dollar pass-through to increase by 3.5–7.6 percentage points. e R2 values
of the panel regressions are substantially improved by adding the invoicing share interaction terms.
Figs. 4 and 5 depict the regression results visually in the form of impulse response functions.
Fig. 4 shows the impulse responses of the bilateral import price level. e top row shows unweighted
regression results, the boom row uses trade weights as described above. e le column shows the
bilateral pass-through in the specications without the dollar exchange rate, while the right column
compares the bilateral and dollar pass-throughs in specications with both exchange rates. Fig. 5
illustrates the pass-through heterogeneity as a function of the invoicing share Sj , as implied by the
regression specications with interactions. e gure focuses on three dollar shares: Sj = 0.13
(corresponding to Switzerland), Sj = 0.59 (Turkey), and Sj = 0.88 (Argentina). As depicted in
Fig. 5, dollar pass-through is highest for Argentina with the largest dollar invoicing share and the
least for Switzerland with its low dollar share. In the trade-weighted regressions (boom row of
Fig. 5), dollar pass-through is lower than bilateral pass-through for Switzerland, and that ranking is
ipped for the case of Turkey and Argentina.
Online appendix A.2.1 shows that dollar dominance holds up qualitatively across ows between
dierent country groups, advanced or emerging. Although ows between emerging markets exhibit
stronger dollar dominance, our results are not limited to ows involving emerging markets.17
3.4 Trade Volume Elasticity
Having demonstrated the outsized role of the U.S. dollar for international prices, we now show that
the dollar also dominates the bilateral exchange rate when predicting bilateral trade volumes (testable
implication 3). Table 4 shows the results from panel regressions of trade volumes on bilateral and
dollar exchange rates. Let yij denote the log volume of goods exported from country i to country
17ese facts are in line with the results in Table 3 for regressions that interact with the dollar invoicing share, since
emerging markets tend to have higher dollar invoicing shares.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses of bilateral price level to bilateral eij,t and USD e$j,t exchange rates. Based on the
regressions in Table 3 without interactions. Top row: unweighted regression, boom row: trade-weighted. Le
column: specications (1) and (4), right column: specications (2) and (5). Error bars: 95% condence intervals,
clustering by dyad.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses of bilateral price level to bilateral eij,t and USD e$j,t exchange rates, as a function of
importer’s dollar invoicing share Sj . Based on regression specications (3) and (6) in Table 3 with interactions.
Top row: unweighted regression, boom row: trade-weighted. Error bars: 95% condence intervals, clustering
by dyad.
33
Trade elasticity with respect to exchange rate
unweighted trade-weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆yij,t ∆yij,t ∆yij,t ∆yij,t ∆yij,t ∆yij,t
∆eij,t -0.119*** -0.0310* -0.0765* -0.0901*** -0.0163 -0.0971**
(0.0139) (0.0160) (0.0403) (0.0182) (0.0236) (0.0380)
∆eij,t × Sj 0.118* 0.124**
(0.0684) (0.0519)
∆e$j,t -0.186*** -0.140** -0.155*** -0.131**
(0.0250) (0.0600) (0.0277) (0.0658)
∆e$j,t × Sj -0.0903 -0.00581
(0.0871) (0.0846)
R-squared 0.069 0.071 0.074 0.172 0.179 0.215
Observations 52,272 52,272 38,582 52,272 52,272 38,582
Dyads 2,807 2,807 2,014 2,807 2,807 2,014
Table 4: e rst (resp., last) three columns use unweighted (resp. trade-weighted) regressions. All regressions
include two ∆ER lags, lags 0–2 of importer ∆GDP, and time FE. S.e. clustered by dyad. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
j. Our volume regressions take the same form as in the price pass-through regression, Eq. (21),
except that the dependent variable is now the log growth rate ∆yij,t of bilateral trade volumes, and
the extra controls Xj,t (here indexed by j rather than i) consist of the log growth rate of real GDP
(and two lags) for the importing country j. ese regressions do not capture structural demand
elasticity parameters, since we do not aempt to control for all relevant relative prices, and the
importer’s GDP growth is an imperfect proxy for the level of import demand. In particular, we cannot
simply add importer × year xed eects since these would absorb the dollar exchange rate. Hence
our results will invariably conate expenditure switching and shis in aggregate import demand.
e correct interpretation is to view these regressions as predictive relationships that may inform
potential structural estimation exercises. Nevertheless, we will refer to the coecients on exchange
rates as “trade elasticities” for simplicity.
e volume regressions underline the dominant role played by the U.S. dollar. As in the case of
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Figure 6: Impulse responses of bilateral volume to bilateral eij,t and USD e$j,t exchange rates. Based on re-
gressions in Table 4 without interactions. Top row: unweighted regression, boom row: trade-weighted. Le
column: specications (1) and (4), right column: specications (2) and (5). Error bars: 95% condence intervals,
clustering by dyad.
the price pass-through regressions, adding the dollar exchange rate to the volume regressions knocks
down the coecient on the bilateral exchange rate by a substantial amount. e contemporaneous
elasticity for the dollar exchange rate is about -0.19 to -0.13 across specications, while the elastic-
ity for the bilateral exchange rate is an order of magnitude smaller. Unlike the price pass-through
regressions, the interactions of exchange rate changes with the importer’s dollar invoicing share are
mostly imprecisely estimated here.
Fig. 6 visually depicts the regression results in the form of impulse responses. e gure shows
the response of the level of bilateral trade volume to exchange rate shocks. e right column shows
results from regressions with both bilateral and dollar exchange rates. It is apparent from the gure
that the dollar exchange rate has a much more negative impact eect than the bilateral exchange rate.
Yet, the gure also shows that the eect of either exchange rate on the level is essentially neutral at
horizons of 1–2 years. One potential explanation is that the ratio of import prices and domestic prices
adjust with a lag to exchange rate changes, implying that a year aer the initial shock, relative prices
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Price pass-through: Flows to and from U.S.
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Figure 7: Impulse response of bilateral price level to bilateral exchange rate eij,t. Le column: U.S. exports,
right column: U.S. imports. Error bars: 95% condence intervals, clustering by dyad and applying small-sample
“LZ2-BM” adjustment in Imbens and Kolesa´r (2016).
faced by consumers are mostly unchanged compared to the period before the shock. However, we
show in online appendix A.2.5 that this particular nding is driven by the early years in our sample,
as results on the 2002–2015 subsample point toward a large and persistent negative eect of dollar
appreciations on the volume of bilateral trade.
Online appendix A.2.1 conrms that the contemporaneous trade elasticity of the dollar dom-
inates the bilateral exchange rate elasticity in most breakdowns of emerging/advanced economy
trade ows. Overall, the data indicates that a substantially negative dollar elasticity, coupled with a
smaller bilateral exchange rate elasticity, is a common feature to emerging and advanced economy
trade ows.
3.5 Trade Flows to and from the U.S.
e data is consistent with an additional key prediction of DCP: trade ows with the U.S. are special
(testable implications 2-3). Specically, we show that bilateral exchange rate pass-through into U.S.
export prices (in the destination currency) is complete and immediate, while U.S. import prices (in
dollars) are insensitive to bilateral exchange rates. Moreover, U.S. import volumes are insensitive to
the bilateral exchange rate, as predicted by theory.
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Trade elasticity: U.S. vs. non-U.S. imports
unweighted trade-weighted
(1) (2)
∆yij,t ∆yij,t
∆eij,t -0.121*** -0.107***
(0.0141) (0.0194)
∆eij,t × ImpUS 0.124*** 0.117***
(0.0329) (0.0318)
R-squared 0.069 0.180
Observations 52,272 52,272
Dyads 2,807 2,807
Table 5: “ImpUS” is in indicator for whether importing country is the U.S. Both regressions include two ∆ER
lags, lags 0–2 of importer ∆GDP, and time FE, as well as interactions of these variables with ImpUS. S.e. clustered
by dyad. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Fig. 7 shows impulse response functions of import prices for goods owing from or to the U.S.
ese gures are obtained from panel regressions as in the baseline unweighted xed eects speci-
cations in Section 3.3, except we drop the dollar exchange rate (but preserve the time xed eects).
Consistent with the very high fraction of U.S. exports and imports being invoiced in dollars (97%
and 93%, respectively), bilateral exchange rate pass-through into prices is 100% on impact for U.S.
exports and close to zero for U.S. imports.
Table 5 conrms that U.S. import volumes are insensitive to bilateral exchange rates, unlike the
imports of the rest of the world from the U.S. We run a xed eects regression of trade volume
growth on lagged bilateral exchange rates, importer GDP, and year xed eects, as in specications
(1) and (4) of Table 4. Here, however, we additionally interact all right-hand side variables with an
indicator for whether the importing country is the U.S. When the importing country is not the U.S.,
the within-year bilateral trade volume response is estimated at -0.12% (unweighted) following a 1%
depreciation of the importer currency, similar to the all-country regression in Table 4. In contrast, we
nd U.S. imports to be completely insensitive to the bilateral exchange rate on impact, with an im-
plied contemporaneous import volume response of 0.003% following a 1% depreciation of the dollar.
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e dierence between the contemporaneous import elasticity for the U.S. vs. that for the rest of the
world is highly signicant. Hence, the data indicates that U.S. trade balance adjustment following
exchange rate movements occurs primarily through exports rather than imports, a consequence of
the predominance of dollar invoicing in U.S. trade.
3.6 Eect of U.S. Dollar on Rest-of-World Trade and Ination
Underscoring the quantitative signicance of DCP, we argue now that the dollar has substantial
predictive power for aggregate trade among countries in the rest of the world (testable implication
4). at is, the dollar is important for predicting global trade, even when excluding countries’ direct
trade with the U.S. Specically, a 1% U.S. dollar appreciation against all other currencies in the world
predicts a 0.6% decline within a year in the volume of total trade between countries in the rest of the
world, holding constant various proxies for the global business cycle.
We measure the elasticity of rest-of-world trade volume to the dollar by aggregating up from
our richest bilateral panel regression specication. is produces results that exploit our panel data
set, unlike a simple annual time series regression of global trade on an eective dollar exchange rate
index. Consider the following regression model with bilateral, dollar, and euro exchange rates, as
well as interactions with dollar and euro import invoicing shares:
∆yij,t =
∑2
k=0
(
βk + ηk(1− Sj − Sej )
)
∆eij,t−k
+
∑2
k=0
(
β$k + η
$
kSj
)
∆e$j,t−k
+
∑2
k=0
(
βek + η
e
k S
e
j
)
∆eej,t−k
+ λij + θ
′Xij,t + εij,t. (22)
Here Sj and Sej are the importer’s country-level dollar and euro invoicing shares, respectively, and
λij is a dyad xed eect. Because we are interested in the eect of a dollar appreciation against all
other currencies, we do not control for time xed eects. Instead, we control for several proxies for
the global business cycle, as described in online appendix A.2.3, except here we exclude world export
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volume growth. Xij,t also includes lags 0–2 of importer real GDP growth.
e object of interest is the response of rest-of-world (i.e., ex-U.S.) aggregate trade volume to a
1% appreciation of the dollar relative to all other currencies, holding constant the global business
cycle. As in Eq. (19) of Section 2.4, we consider the weighted average trade elasticity to a dollar
appreciation, where we average over all trading pairs in the world, excluding the U.S. Consistent
with the focus on importers in the rest of this section, our empirical specication in Eq. (22) assumes
that the trade elasticity is heterogeneous across importers but homogeneous across exporters. at
is, in the notation of Eq. (19), the trade elasticity at lag k with respect to the dollar exchange rate is
given by σij = σj = β$k+η$kSj . Letwj denote country j’s total non-commodity import value from all
countries except the U.S. in some reference year, normalized so that
∑
j 6=$wj = 1.18 en the ceteris
paribus eect of a 1% dollar appreciation on
∑
j 6=$wj∆yij,t, the weighted growth of rest-of-world
imports from destination i, is given by
∑
j 6=$wj(β
$
k + η
$
kSj) = β
$
k + η
$
k
∑
j 6=$wjSj
k years aer the appreciation, and this quantity is by assumption the same for each exporter i other
than the U.S. us, to measure the response of rest-of-world aggregate imports to a dollar appre-
ciation, we simply use the estimated Eq. (22) to compute the impulse response of trade volume for
an importer j whose U.S. dollar invoicing share happens to equal
∑
j 6=$wjSj , the weighted average
dollar invoicing share.19
Fig. 8 shows that rest-of-world aggregate import volume contracts markedly following an ap-
preciation of the dollar against all other currencies. A 1% ceteris paribus dollar appreciation leads
to a 0.6% contraction in rest-of-world trade volume within the year (regardless of whether we use
unweighted or trade-weighted regressions), and this contractionary eect persists out to at least two
years. Recall that the regression controls for various proxies for the global business and nancial
18“All countries” refers to the world aggregate in Comtrade, not only the countries in our regression sample. Note that
the weight wj is dierent from the weights used in the trade-weighted regressions in Table 4 and elsewhere.
19In practice, wj depends on the year in which import values are measured, but online appendix A.2.5 shows that the
weighted average
∑
j 6=$ wjSj uctuates lile around a mean of 0.40 in the 2002–2015 sample, so we use that value.
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Response of rest-of-world aggregate trade to USD appreciation, 2002–2015
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Figure 8: Impulse responses of rest-of-world aggregate trade volume to a 1% U.S. dollar appreciation against all
other currencies, holding constant all other exchange rates and the global business cycle. Top row: unweighted
regression, boom row: trade-weighted. Error bars: 95% condence intervals, clustering by dyad.
cycles. While our regression specication cannot be interpreted structurally, the magnitude of the
predictive eect underscores the importance of the dollar’s role in world trade. Online appendix
A.2.4 shows that the large negative predictive eect of a dollar appreciation on world trade is robust
to controlling for the exchange rates of the Swiss franc and Japanese yen. Hence, the central nding
in this subsection is not an artifact of conating periods of overall dollar appreciation with periods
of global ight to safety.
Finally, country-level regressions reveal signicant dollar pass-through to foreign consumer and
producer prices that increases with countries’ dollar invoicing share in imports. Earlier work by
Gopinath (2015) provides back-of-the-envelope calculations of dollar exchange rate spillovers on
foreign consumer and producer prices based on estimated country-level import price pass-through
and the import content of consumption. We take a more direct approach and regress countries’ CPI
or PPI on the dollar exchange rate as well as its interaction with the dollar invoicing share in imports
using a specication with country and time xed eects, detailed in online appendix A.2.2. We nd
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the average pass-through of the dollar into CPI (resp., PPI) to be 11% (resp., 28%) within the year, and
is higher for countries with a higher dollar invoicing share of imports.
3.7 Robustness
Our results are robust to many dierent variations, some of which have already been mentioned in
previous sections alongside the description of our benchmark results and summarized here. First,
our results are robust when considering trade ows within/across advanced or emerging market
economies (see online appendix A.2.1). In particular, our results are not limited to ows involving
emerging markets.
Second, our results are robust to excluding the global nancial crisis and to controlling for the
euro exchange rate. Online appendix A.2.5 documents that our headline results are not driven by the
global nancial crisis starting in 2008. e estimated average exchange rate pass-through and trade
elasticity computed on the 1992–2007 sample are almost identical to our baseline Figs. 4 and 6. When
computing the eect of a uniform U.S. dollar appreciation on rest-of-world trade as in Section 3.6,
we nd even stronger eects during the pre-crisis period 2002–2007.
ird, online appendix A.2.3 shows that the euro exchange rate is much less quantitatively im-
portant than the dollar exchange rate in price and volume regressions. Lastly, online appendix A.2.4
shows that the large negative predictive eect of a dollar appreciation on world trade is robust to
further controlling for the exchange rates of the Swiss franc and Japanese yen.
4 Firm Level Empirical Evidence
We now move from aggregate bilateral data on trade volume and value to rm level customs data on
exports and imports for a small open economy, Colombia. While the global evidence has the virtue
of covering 91% of world trade, it lacks granularity and the indices are at the annual frequency. To
assuage any concerns that our ndings may be contaminated by composition eects this section
demonstrates that the ndings in Section 3 hold when we dene prices and quantities at the rm-
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10-digit product-country (origin or destination)-quarter (or year) level. In addition we show that
the DCP model matches the dynamic path of price pass-through in the data unlike the competing
paradigms. e details of the data are relegated to online appendix A.3.
e Colombian currency (peso) is a commodity currency and uctuations in its value are strongly
negatively correlated with uctuations in commodity prices.20 Fig. 9 displays the relation between
the Colombian peso (peso price of the dollar, solid line) and the overall (log) terms-of-trade (dashed
line), dened as the log dierence between import and export prices. is terms-of-trade is driven
primarily by commodity prices. e correlation between the two series is 0.62 and a regression of
the overall terms of trade on the peso/dollar exchange rate yields a coecient on the exchange rate
of 1.15 (R2 of 0.38). If we focus instead on the non-commodity terms-of-trade (dots-and-dash line)
we nd that the terms-of-trade is far more stable with a regression coecient of 0.33 (R2 of 0.36),
consistent with the predictions of the model under DCP.21
In the rest of our empirical analysis we focus on manufactured goods, consistent with the ap-
proach in Section 3, excluding products in the petrochemicals and basic metals industries. We follow
the ISIC Rev. 3.1 classication to dene which products are manufactures.22
4.1 Results
We estimate the same pass-through regression of exchange rates into import and export prices (mea-
sured in pesos) as in Section 3, Eq. (21), omiing interaction terms and time eects, since the laer
would absorb the dollar exchange rate. We include rm-industry-country xed eect, which sub-
sume dyad xed eects, as well as quarter dummies to account for seasonality.23 We add the contem-
poraneous eect and eight lags of the quarterly log change in the nominal exchange rate of the peso
20e Colombian peso ocially switched to a oating status in 1999. Commodity prices can be considered as exogenous
to the economy: while mining output makes up 58.4% of total exports for Colombia, it is small relative to world commodity
markets. For example, Colombia’s oil production was 1.1% of world oil production in 2014.
21e TOT(manuf) is constructed by excluding ‘traditional’ exports/imports such as oil, coal, metals, coee, bananas or
owers. Although it does not consist exclusively of manufactured goods, these represent more than 90 percent of the basket.
22As a robustness check we also use the subsample of dierentiated products only (instead of the full set of manufactures
presented) constructed using the classication of goods by Rauch (1999). is is available in online appendix A.4.
23We also estimate the regression controlling for contemporaneous and eight lags of quarterly log changes in the producer
price index in Colombia and in the origin/destination country and our estimates are practically unchanged.
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Exchange rate and terms of trade for Colombia
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Figure 9: Data from Banco de la Repu´blica. TOT is calculated using the PPI of all imports and exports. TOT
(Manuf) is calculated using the PPI for ‘non-traditional’ imports and exports, that exclude products such as oil,
coal and metals, and include mostly manufactured goods.
relative to the dollar regardless of origin or destination country. e cumulative estimates
∑k
s=0 βs
and two standard error bands with standard errors clustered at the quarter-year level are ploed in
Fig. 10. It reports the pass-through into export and import prices (columns) to/from dollarized and
non-dollarized countries (rows).
Consistent with DCP, all pass-throughs start out close to one and decline slowly over time. is
is the case for both export and import prices and for dollar and non-dollar destinations/origins. In
the case of export prices to dollar destinations the contemporaneous estimate is 0.84 and then the
cumulative pass-through slowly decreases aer two years to 0.56. e estimates are similar in the
case of non-dollar destinations. In the case of import prices from dollar origins pass-through is very
high, around 1 and the cumulative eect declines to 0.8. For non-dollar origins the estimated pass-
through starts at around 0.87 and decreases to 0.49 aer two years.
e second set of regressions replicates the regressions in Section 3 by aggregating data to the an-
nual frequency (the unit of observation remains rm-10-digit product-country-origin/destination).
e estimates are reported in Table 6 for the various specications. e results re-conrm the nd-
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Figure 10: Exchange rate pass-through into export and import prices, to/from dollarized and non-dollarized
economies. All regressions include Firm-Industry-Country xed eects and quarterly dummies. 95% condence
intervals shown with s.e. clustered at the quarter-year level. e sample includes all manufactured products
excluding petrochemicals and basic metals industries. Dollarized economies include USA, Puerto Rico, Panama,
Ecuador and El Salvador. Non-dollarized economies include all other partners, except economies with currencies
pegged to the dollar and Venezuela.
ings in Section 3 of the important role of the dollar in pass-through regressions. Robustness checks
are presented in online appendix A.4.
Table 7 reports the results from annual quantity regressions. Starting with the dollarized economies,
the pass-through to export quantities is insignicantly dierent from zero. On the other hand, for
imports from dollarized economies there is a pronounced decline in quantities imported across all
specications. In the case of the non-dollarized economies, the decline in imports is also signi-
cantly negative and, importantly, the relevant exchange rate is the peso/dollar exchange rates as
opposed to the bilateral exchange rate. For exports we again have that the relevant exchange rate is
the peso/dollar exchange rate.
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Exchange rate pass-through into prices, annual data
dollarized economies non-dollarized economies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆pH,t ∆pH,t ∆pH,t ∆pH,t ∆pH,t ∆pH,t
Exports
∆eiH,t 0.673*** 0.0616 0.523*** 0.0726
(0.0937) (0.0474) (0.120) (0.0452)
∆e$H,t 0.696*** 0.828*** 0.667*** 0.633***
(0.0331) (0.0355) (0.0507) (0.0602)
PPI no yes no no yes yes
R-squared 0.288 0.290 0.303 0.305 0.308 0.310
Observations 169,792 159,041 206,226 206,226 139,318 139,318
Imports
∆eiH,t 0.750*** 0.315*** 0.506*** 0.275***
(0.116) (0.0777) (0.127) (0.0837)
∆e$H,t 0.977*** 1.007*** 0.528*** 0.534***
(0.0177) (0.0309) (0.0650) (0.0510)
PPI no yes no no yes yes
R-squared 0.225 0.225 0.287 0.290 0.291 0.293
Observations 529,584 529,260 931,993 931,993 808,304 808,304
Table 6: All regressions include Firm-Industry-Country xed eects. S.e. clustered at the year level. e sample
includes all manufactured products excluding petrochemicals and basic metals industries. e results are robust
to the inclusion of the peso/euro exchange rate as a potential alternative dominant currency, and to the inclusion
of two ∆ER lags. If we limit the sample to dierentiated products only, results are qualitatively unchanged. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Trade elasticity with respect to exchange rate, annual data
dollarized non-dollarized
(1) (2) (3)
∆yH,t ∆yH,t ∆yH,t
Exports
∆eiH,t -0.763*** -0.0553
(0.212) (0.314)
∆e$H,t -0.425 -1.007**
(0.370) (0.322)
Euro ER yes no yes
R-squared 0.225 0.250 0.245
Observations 159,041 139,318 120,316
Imports
∆eiH,t -0.703*** -0.319
(0.217) (0.246)
∆e$H,t -0.959*** -0.922***
(0.407) (0.245)
Euro ER yes no yes
R-squared 0.184 0.236 0.254
Observations 529,276 808,409 519,002
Table 7: All regressions control for PPI, importer GDP, and Firm-Industry-Country xed eects. S.e. clustered
at the year level. See also caption for Table 6. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
4.2 Matching Model and Data
In this section we simulate data for a small open economy calibrated to match the Colombian econ-
omy (denoted H) that trades with the dominant currency area (denoted $ in this section) and the
rest-of-the world R. e model is identical to the one described in Section 2 except that we modify
the budget constraint slightly to include shocks to oil earnings. Specically the budget constraint
takes the form:
Pj,tCj,t + E$j,t(1 + i$j,t−1)B$j,t +Bj,t = Wj,t(h)Nj,t(h) + Πj,t + E$j,tB$j,t+1
46
+
∑
s′∈S
Qj,t(s
′)Bj,t+1(s′) + E$j,tζt.
where ζt is the dollar value of the endowment of oil. A decline in ζt captures a decline in the price
of oil. We capture the relation between E$H,t and ERH,t using the following reduced form relation
between the two real exchange rates (in logs):
eRH,t + pR,t − pH,t = η
(
e$H,t + p$,t − pH,t
)
+ εR,t (23)
In Eq. (23), pi,t denotes the (log) consumer price level in country i ∈ $, R in its respective currencies,
εR,t captures idiosyncratic uctuations in the $-R exchange rate while η captures the co-movement
between the two real exchange rates. With this exible specication, we can explore separately how
uctuations in E$H,t and ERH,t impact prices and quantities inH , under dierent pricing paradigms.24
e model therefore features three sources of uctuations: productivity shocks at, endowment
shocks ζt that capture the exogenous uctuations in the price of oil, and exogenous shocks to the
$-R exchange rate εR,t. ese shocks follow autoregressive processes:
ζt − ζ¯ = ρζ(ζt−1 − ζ¯) + ζ,t (24)
at = ρaat−1 + a,t (25)
εR,t = ρRεR,t−1 + R,t (26)
where ζ¯ is the steady state value of the commodity price, and ζ,t are serially independently dis-
tributed innovations. We allow the productivity and commodity price innovations to be correlated,
and denote ρa,ζ = corr(a,t, ζ,t).
We use a combination of calibration and estimation to parameterize the model, the details of
which are provided in online appendix A.5. We match several moments in the data, including price
pass-through regression coecients as well as estimated parameters in the time series processes
24An alternative set-up would be to allow for the small open economy to borrow internationally in both $ and R curren-
cies. en, even if interest rates in the $ and R do not change, shocks that drive a wedge in the UIP conditions (commonly
used to capture risk-premia shocks) for each of the two currencies will generate uctuations in E$H,t/ERH,t.
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for Colombia’s real exchange rate, value added and commodity prices. e estimated model is very
close to DCP. e export invoicing shares for Colombia are measured in the data directly and is
100% for exports to $ and 93% for exports to R. e estimated import invoicing shares are 100% for
imports from $ and 93% for those from R. We simulate the parametrized model and plot the pass-
through estimates from the estimated model, and counterfactual DCP, PCP and LCP models against
the estimates from the data. In the case of the laer three we force the invoicing shares to take the
extreme values of each of the paradigms, keeping all other parameter values unchanged.
Dynamics of pass-through. Fig. 11 reports the values for price pass-through for dollar destina-
tions and Fig. 12 for non-dollar destinations. In each gure, export price pass-through are reported
in the le column, and import price pass-through in the right column. Each row corresponds to a
dierent model: the estimated model (top row), a full DCP counterfactual (second row), a PCP coun-
terfactual (third row) and a LCP counterfactual (last row). Large solid circles for the pass-through of
export and import prices to/from various destinations at impact represent values that were used in
moment matching. e pass-through at other lags were not used in estimating parameters.
As is evident, the estimated model replicates the pass-through estimates at various lags for export
prices to $ and R and for import prices from $ quite closely. While the match is less good for import
prices from R, we still obtain that pass-through starts high and declines gradually. Inspecting the
dierent rows, it is immediate that the estimated model is very close to DCP, and very dierent from
a PCP or LCP counterfactual. PCP implies low initial pass-through into export prices, which then
gradually increases over time, as prices are sticky in the exporting currency. LCP implies low pass-
through into import prices, which then increases over time, as prices are sticky in the importing
currency. In the case of non-dollar trading partners we similarly observe that DCP outperforms both
PCP and LCP.
Relevance of bilateral exchange rates. e estimated model also matches the empirical fact that
bilateral exchange rates show up as large and signicant when they are the only exchange rate con-
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Exchange rate pass-through for dollar origin/destination: Data vs. model
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Figure 11: Exchange rate pass-through into export and import prices for Colombia with respect to dollar
economies.
49
Exchange rate pass-through for non-dollar origin/destination: Data vs. model
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Figure 12: Exchange rate pass-through into export and import prices for Colombia with respect to non-dollar
economies.
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Exchange rate pass-through into prices: Estimated model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆pHR,t ∆pHR,t ∆pRH,t ∆pRH,t
∆eRH,t 0.72 0.28 0.68 0.22
∆e$H,t 0.66 0.70
Table 8: Exchange rate pass-through into export and import prices to/from non-dollarized economies using
model simulated data. Regressions have the bilateral exchange rate and the dollar exchange rate as controls.
Exchange rate pass-through into qantities: Estimated model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆yH$,t ∆y$H,t ∆yHR,t ∆yRH,t
∆e$H,t 0.26 -1.60 -1.33 -1.19
∆eRH,t -0.18 0.28 1.43 -0.11
Table 9: Exchange rate pass-through into export and import quantities to/from dollarized and non-dollarized
economies. Regressions have the bilateral exchange rate, the dollar exchange rate, and the level of demand as
controls.
trol in price or quantity regressions (for non-dollar destinations and origins), but drop signicantly
as a predictor of prices once the dollar exchange rate is also included in the specication. is is re-
ported in Table 8 for price pass-through regressions and in Table 9 for trade elasticity regressions.25
e estimated model generates a weak expansion in exports to $ destinations following a deprecia-
tion and a more pronounced contraction in imports from both $ and R consistent with the empirical
evidence in Table 7. Exports to R are negatively impacted by depreciations relative to the dollar.
Here again the dollar exchange rate is a major predictor of quantities for non-dollar regions.
25Online appendix A.5 documents that PCP and LCP are unable to match these facts.
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Exchange rate pass-through: Role of α and Γ
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Figure 13: Exchange rate pass-through into export and import prices to/from dollar ($) or non-dollar (R)
economies, for varying choices of α and Γ.
Importance of non-zero α and Γ. Finally, Fig. 13 explores the role of strategic complementari-
ties in pricing and imported input use in production for our results. It contrasts the pass-through
estimates when Γ (the markup elasticity) and α (the intermediate input share) are both set to 0 rel-
ative to the benchmark of Γ = 1 and α = 2/3 (dashed line). is imposes constant mark-ups and
a production function with labor only. e le column reports the dynamic pass-through of export
prices, and the right column that of import prices. e top row reports export and import prices
to/from $ and the boom row to/from R. Export price pass-through into H prices declines by a half
at the one year horizon when Γ and α are both set equal to 0 (line with solid circles), compared to
the data and the benchmark model predictions. In the case of import pass-through the dierence is
smaller (as to be expected given that the marginal cost of foreign rms are taken as exogenous), but
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in all cases the model’s match with the data is the best under the benchmark specication. Strategic
complementarities in pricing and imported input use in production are important factors controlling
the (slow) dynamic of price pass-throughs.
5 Conclusion
Most trade is invoiced in very few currencies. Building from this key observation, this paper presents
a dominant currency paradigm characterized by three key features: pricing in a dominant currency,
strategic complementarities in pricing and imported input use in production. We integrate these
new elements into a model of small or large open economies. e model is used to understand the
consequences of home or dominant monetary policy shocks on exchange rates and uctuations. e
model predicts (a) stability in the terms-of-trade; (b) that the dollar (i.e., dominant) exchange rate
dominates bilateral exchange rate in price pass-through and trade elasticity regressions outside the
U.S.; (c) high and persistent pass-through into export and import prices; (d) that global trade outside
the U.S. declines when the dollar appreciates.
We validate empirically these predictions using two sources of data. First, at the aggregate level,
we use a newly constructed global bilateral trade dataset that covers 91% of world trade. en,
we test the implications of the theory using micro data at the rm-product-destination-year level
from Colombia. All the key implications of the DCP are conrmed empirically, while other pricing
paradigms are soundly rejected.
Looking forward, the dominant currency paradigm has striking implications for economic policy
and its spillovers. For instance, we demonstrate that the ination-output trade-o in response to a
monetary policy shock is seriously impaired under DCP compared to the usual case of PCP. Mon-
etary policy shocks in the dominant currency country also have strong spillovers to the rest of the
world, while the converse is not true: the dominant currency country is largely insulated from the
inationary consequences of uctuations in its currency, which are absorbed instead into prices and
trade in the rest of the world. is has important implications for monetary policy, which are explore
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at greater length in Casas et al. (2016). For instance, under DCP, a small open economy’s optimal
monetary policy is no longer able to aain both zero producer price ination and zero output gap in
circumstances where producer currency pricing would.
Our framework takes the invoicing currency choice as given. Yet we have been careful to point
out that most of our results would hold even with endogenous currency invoicing. First, some ingre-
dients from our model, namely imported input use in production and strategic complementarities in
pricing, are precisely those that would give rise endogenously to dominant currency in pricing. is
is demonstrated by Gopinath et al. (2010) in a partial equilibrium environment and more recently
by Mukhin (2018) in a general equilibrium seing. Second, Gopinath et al. (2010) show that rms
choose to price in currencies in which their reset prices are most stable, i.e., the desired medium-run
pass-through into prices (expressed in the invoicing currency) is low. In other words, our empirical
ndings will continue to be relevant in an environment with endogenous currency choice.
Taking a step back, our paper conrms that the dominance of the U.S. dollar is pervasive, from
the structure of external balance sheets (Gourinchas and Rey (2014)), the currency composition of
private portfolios (Maggiori et al. (2018)), the choice of anchor currency (Ilzetzki et al. (2017) and
trade invoicing, with important and complex interactions which we are only starting to explore (e.g.,
Gopinath and Stein (2018)).
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A ONLINE APPENDIX: NOT FOR PUBLICATION
A.1 Macro Data
Here we provide further details on the Comtrade, WDI, and FRED data.
A.1.1 Data Construction
Comtrade. UN Comtrade provides detailed annual customs data for a large set of countries at HS 6-digit
product level with information about the destination country, USD value, quantity, and weight of imports and
exports. is dataset makes it possible to compute volume changes over time for each product, and use the value
data to infer unit values. Once unit values are calculated, we compute chained Fisher price indices to aggregate up
from the product level to the bilateral country level.26 We focus entirely on data for non-commodity goods, except
noted otherwise. Given the inherent diculty in drawing a line between commodities and non-commodities,
we dene commodities fairly broadly as HS chapters 1–27 and 72–83, which comprise animal, vegetable, food,
mineral, and metal products.
Coverage of Comtrade at annual frequency over time and across countries is good. e longest time span of
the data is 1989–2015, although the coverage varies by dyad. Appendix A.1.2 lists the coverage by country. In
2015, the 55 countries in our sample were responsible for 91.2% and 91.5% of the value of world goods imports
and exports, respectively, as recorded in Comtrade. We exclusively use Comtrade data reported by the importing
country, as importer-reported data is regarded as being more reliable since imports generate tari revenues
(Feenstra et al., 2005; World Bank, 2010).
e biggest challenge for constructing price and volume indices using customs data is the so-called unit
value bias, as argued by Silver (2007). Unit values, calculated simply by dividing observed values by quantities,
are not actual prices. Even at the narrowly dened product categories at 6-digit product level, there is likely to
be a wide range of products whose prices may not be moving proportionately. e implication is that if there are
shis in quantities traded within the narrowly dened product categories, unit values would be inuenced even
when there is no price movement. is creates a bias that the employed methodology takes a stab at correcting
for by eliminating products whose unit values have a variance higher than a threshold and are more likely to be
biased.
e second challenge that arises from using Comtrade data is related to the use of dierent HS vintages over
time. HS classication is updated about every ve years to ensure that the available codings accurately reect
the variety of products being traded. is involves introducing codes for new products, eliminating the old ones,
and oen regrouping existing products. While concordances are readily available to facilitate the matching of
HS codes across dierent HS vintages, this process inevitably leads to a loss of information, especially in the
case of data on quantities, because the mapping of products across vintages is rarely one-to-one. To get around
this problem, for the years in which there is a transition to a new HS vintage, we compute the indices twice,
once under the old vintage (using concordances) and once under the new one. is way, only these transition
years would be eected by the loss of information due to matching across vintages. Aer that year, we switch
to working with the new vintage. is method not only minimizes the loss of information but also allows us to
include new products in the construction of the indices. Boz et al. (2019) provide further details of this method,
including the strategy for dealing with outliers and missing values.
e third potential challenge is associated with the conversion of trade values into and out of dollars. Ex-
change rate conversion can be made by data compilers at the country level and by Comtrade. United Nation’s
2006 Survey of National Compilation and Reporting Practices suggests that almost all countries in our sample use
an exchange rate from an ocial source and most countries use a daily exchange rate at the date of exporting or
importing. ose that declare not using daily rates report using monthly exchange rates. All in all, results of this
survey suggest exchange rate conversion at the country level to be prey accurate. As for Comtrade, for those
countries reporting in local currency, Comtrade uses an annual exchange rate that weighs monthly exchange
rates from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF by monthly trade ows. According to the Explanatory
Notes provided by Comtrade, most emerging markets report in dollars and advanced economies report in local
26e Fisher price index satises a number of tests laid out in index number theory and is exible enough to provide a
good proxy for a large set of functional forms (Gaulier et al., 2008; IMF, 2009).
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currency. Because our regressions for dierent country groups in online appendix A.2.1 show similar results for
advanced and emerging country ows, any discrepancies in how annual exchange rate conversions are done by
dierent countries appear to not substantially inuence our qualitative ndings.
In the nal stage, we compare our unit value indices to those provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) for the U.S., the only country, to our knowledge, that collects import price indices based on price surveys
by origin. As shown in online appendix A.1.3, this comparison for the U.S. suggests that working with unit values
is acceptable, as the growth rates of the two series are broadly aligned for most trading partners. Further, the
results on pass-through into U.S. import and export prices using our constructed unit value indices are wholly
consistent with the estimates in Casas et al. (2016) and Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) that are based on BLS data.
Lastly, Boz et al. (2019) nd favorable results when comparing country-level indices with those from the WTO
and IMF World Economic Outlook.
Currency invoicing share. For currency invoicing shares we use the data set constructed by Gopinath
(2015). e invoicing shares tend to be fairly stable over time so we take their simple averages over the years
in which they are reported during 1999–2014. Appendix A.1.2 lists the USD and euro import invoicing share for
the 39 countries in our sample with available invoicing data.
World Development Indicator data. e exchange rate is the World Bank’s “alternative conversion fac-
tor” series (PA.NUS.ATLS), which corrects for redenominations and currency substitution, and is measured as an
annual average of daily rates. Producer prices are given by the wholesale price index (FP.WPI.TOTL). Real GDP
is measured at market prices in constant U.S. dollars (NY.GDP.MKTP.KD). e GDP deator is given by the ratio
of nominal GDP (NY.GDP.MKTP.CD) and real GDP. Consumer prices are constructed from CPI ination rates
(FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG), or if ination is not available, CPI levels (FP.CPI.TOTL). We use data for 1989–2015 only. e
data was downloaded in September 2016.
FRED data. We obtain the WTI oil price (POILWTIUSDA), VIX (VIXCLS), and 1-year Treasury bill rate
(DTB1YR) from the St. Louis Fed’s FRED database. Annual series are averages of daily indices.
Country groups. For some exercises below, we look at heterogeneity across advanced and emerging economies.
We use the October 2017 IMF World Economic Outlook grouping of advanced economies, and label all other
countries as emerging. is yields 31 advanced and 24 emerging economies, as listed in Appendix A.1.2.
A.1.2 Comtrade Country Summary Statistics
Table 10 lists summary statistics on the number of observations for the 55 countries in our merged Com-
trade/WDI dataset. e table also lists the advanced or emerging economy classication of each country. Finally,
we list the share of imports invoiced in U.S. dollars and euros for the 39 countries for which we observe these
measures (cf. Gopinath, 2015).
A.1.3 Comparison of Comtrade and BLS Price Series for the U.S.
Here we compare our unit value indices to survey price indices from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. e BLS
provides U.S. import price indices by locality of origin for Canada, E.U., France, Germany, U.K, Latin America,
Mexico, Pacic Rim, China, Japan, ASEAN, Asia Near East, and Asian Newly Industrialized countries. As these
price indices are constructed from surveys, their comparison with our unit value based indices can help gauge
the eectiveness of our techniques to deal with the unit value bias and other potential mismeasurement inherent
in customs data.
To arrive at comparable series, in this subsection we follow BLS in using Laspeyres indices of total (com-
modities and non-commodities) goods prices from our Comtrade data set. For regions with multiple countries,
we aggregate country level growth rates using Comtrade import values with a two year lag. Still, the series are
not fully comparable because BLS’ preferred price basis is f.o.b. (free on board) while import values recorded at
customs are c.i.f. (cost, insurance and freight), and not all countries included in BLS regions are in our database.
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Country summary statistics
As exporter As importer
Country Adv #dyads avg T #dyads avg T InvS$ InvSe
Africa
Algeria 20 12.9 46 20.9 0.49
Egypt 53 20.2 50 18.0
South Africa 51 14.8 53 14.7
Americas
Argentina 54 21.0 50 20.6 0.88 0.08
Brazil 54 21.7 50 23.2 0.84 0.11
Canada X 54 22.0 53 24.2 0.75 0.05
Chile 52 20.2 48 17.7
Colombia 52 17.9 49 15.6 0.99 0.00
Mexico 54 21.7 51 23.0
United States X 54 22.0 53 22.8 0.93 0.02
Venezuela 8 17.6 46 17.0
Asia
China 54 21.9 53 21.7
Hong Kong X 53 22.1 51 20.7
India 54 21.9 53 24.0 0.86 0.10
Indonesia 53 21.6 51 21.8 0.81 0.04
Israel X 49 22.1 50 15.0 0.73 0.21
Japan X 54 22.1 52 25.4 0.71 0.03
Kazakhstan 32 15.2 52 14.6
Malaysia 53 22.0 50 23.8
Philippines 54 21.6 47 18.0
Saudi Arabia 50 19.7 50 15.3
Singapore X 54 22.0 50 23.6
South Korea X 54 22.0 51 23.7 0.81 0.05
ailand 54 21.8 51 24.7 0.79 0.04
Turkey 54 22.0 52 24.0 0.59 0.31
Vietnam 50 19.6 46 12.1
(continued on next page)
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Country summary statistics (continued)
As exporter As importer
Country Adv #dyads avg T #dyads avg T InvS$ InvSe
Europe
Austria X 54 22.2 52 20.7 0.06 0.70
Belgium X 53 15.8 53 15.9 0.14 0.82
Czech Republic X 53 20.2 53 21.2 0.19 0.68
Denmark X 54 22.0 52 24.2 0.25 0.32
Estonia X 46 17.0 52 18.0 0.34 0.53
Finland X 54 21.9 52 24.9 0.42 0.38
France X 54 22.2 53 20.7 0.21 0.75
Germany X 54 21.4 53 23.3 0.23 0.75
Greece X 54 21.4 51 22.0 0.40 0.58
Hungary 54 22.0 52 21.5 0.27 0.57
Ireland X 54 21.9 52 21.7 0.23 0.47
Italy X 54 22.2 52 20.7 0.29 0.67
Lithuania X 51 16.8 48 19.0 0.51 0.39
Luxembourg X 49 15.6 51 13.6 0.16 0.78
Netherlands X 54 22.2 53 22.2 0.37 0.46
Norway X 54 22.0 51 21.6 0.21 0.29
Poland 54 21.8 52 20.2 0.30 0.58
Portugal X 54 21.8 52 25.0 0.22 0.76
Romania 53 21.1 50 19.7 0.31 0.67
Russia 53 21.0 52 17.6
Slovak Republic X 50 18.9 51 20.0 0.12 0.79
Slovenia X 54 19.6 52 20.0 0.20 0.75
Spain X 54 22.0 54 24.8 0.35 0.58
Sweden X 54 22.0 54 21.9 0.25 0.36
Switzerland X 54 22.1 54 25.1 0.13 0.53
Ukraine 51 18.8 52 17.2 0.75 0.16
United Kingdom X 54 22.2 54 21.6 0.47 0.15
Oceania
Australia X 54 21.8 51 25.4 0.53 0.08
New Zealand X 53 20.7 50 23.5
Table 10: Summary statistics for countries in the merged Comtrade/WDI sample. Adv: advanced economy (IMF
WEO). #dyads: number of non-missing dyads that the country appears in. avg T : average number of years per
dyad that the country appears in; a dyad-year observation is counted if at least one UVI or volume observation
is reported by the importer, and exchange rate data exists for both countries. InvS: share of imports invoiced in
USD/euro.
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BLS country groups
BLS group Country ISO codes
ASEAN BRN* IDN KHM* LAO* MMR* MYS PHL SGP THA VNM*
Asia Near East ARE* BHR* IRN* IRQ* ISR JOR* KWT* LBN* OMN* QAT* SAU SYR*
YEM*
European Union AUT BEL BGR* CYP* CZE DEU DNK ESP EST FIN FRA GBR GRC
HRV* HUN IRL ITA LTU LUX LVA* MLT* NLD POL PRT ROU SVK
SVN SWE
Latin America ARG BRA CHL COL MEX VEN (plus other unspecied Central Amer-
ican, South American, and Caribbean countries*)
Asian New. Ind. HKG KOR SGP TWN
Pacic Rim AUS BRN* CHN HKG IDN JPN KOR MAC* MYS NZL PHL PNG* SGP
TWN
Table 11: Denition of BLS country groups in Figure 14. Countries marked with an asterisk (*) are not available
in the Comtrade sample.
Our indices constructed from Comtrade unit values track the BLS import price indices fairly well, as shown
in Figures 14 and 15. ese gures compare the linearly detrended logged indices, since our regressions use
log growth rates and absorb any disparity in average growth rates in the intercept. e growth rates of our
indices for Canada, Japan, Mexico, and the aggregated Latin America and Asia Near East match those of BLS
remarkably well. e comparison with some Asian countries suggests that a unit value bias may still be present,
causing the unit value series to be somewhat more volatile than the BLS price series. Nevertheless, for every
country group and individual country except Germany, the correlation coecient between the Comtrade and
BLS growth rates is high. Finally, the match for European countries seems acceptable, with the year 2008 being
an exception. A closer inspection of the case of Germany reveals that a couple of products (transport vehicles)
with large import shares experienced substantial unit value decreases that year according to Comtrade, leading
our indices to decline while the BLS index shows an increase.
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Comtrade and BLS import price indices for U.S.: country groups
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Figure 14: Comparison of BLS Locality of Origin import price indices (thick lines, circles) with our constructed
Comtrade analogues (thin lines, crosses). Ploed indices are logged and linearly detrended. e Comtrade sample
does not cover all countries in the BLS country groups, cf. Table 11.
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Comtrade and BLS import price indices for U.S.: individual countries
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Figure 15: Comparison of BLS Locality of Origin import price indices (thick lines, circles) with our constructed
Comtrade analogues (thin lines, crosses). Ploed indices are logged and linearly detrended.
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Terms of trade and exchange rates: Country group heterogeneity
unweighted trade-weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
E↔E E↔A A↔A E↔E E↔A A↔A
∆totij,t ∆totij,t ∆totij,t ∆totij,t ∆totij,t ∆totij,t
∆eij,t 0.0189 0.0480*** 0.0182 0.0508*** 0.111*** 0.0220
(0.0173) (0.0110) (0.0256) (0.0176) (0.0310) (0.0473)
PPI no no no no no no
R-squared 0.028 0.011 0.008 0.051 0.078 0.025
Observations 3,527 11,857 8,886 3,527 11,857 8,886
Dyads 217 670 460 217 670 460
Table 12: “E↔A”, say, denotes goods ows between Emerging and Advanced economies. e rst (resp., last)
three columns use unweighted (resp. trade-weighted) regressions, as in specications (1) and (3) of Table 2. All
regressions include two ∆ER lags and time FE. S.e. clustered by dyad. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
A.2 Macro Regressions: Supplementary Results
is section provides supplementary macro regression results, including robustness checks.
A.2.1 Country Group Heterogeneity
Tables 12 to 14 display the heterogeneity in estimates when we apply our terms of trade regressions, exchange
rate pass-through regressions and trade elasticity regressions from Sections 3.2 to 3.4 to separate subsamples of
advanced and emerging country trade ows. e results are discussed in the main text.
A.2.2 Spillovers From U.S. Dollar to Foreign Ination
Our results imply that uctuations in the strength of the dollar, for example those caused by U.S. monetary policy
actions, have spillover eects on foreign ination. We have shown that the dollar exchange rate passes strongly
through to bilateral import prices measured in the importer’s currency, especially for countries whose imports
are heavily invoiced in dollars. Given a non-negligible import content in consumption, this implies that dollar
movements will directly aect foreign consumer price index (CPI) ination, as discussed by Gopinath (2015).
If foreign rms behave in a monopolistically competitive way, foreign producer prices will react to changes in
foreign import prices, although perhaps with a lag. Hence, the direct eect of dollar movements on foreign CPI
ination may be amplied by endogenous producer responses.
We now provide direct country-level regression evidence on the eects of the U.S. dollar exchange rate
on foreign consumer and producer prices. Gopinath (2015) computes back-of-the-envelope estimates of these
spillovers based on estimated country-level import price pass-through and the import content of consumption.
We instead directly regress countries’ CPI or PPI on the dollar exchange rate. Additionally, we investigate the
interaction of the dollar exchange rate and the dollar import invoicing share.
Specically, we consider the country-level panel regression
∆cpij,t = λj + δt +
2∑
k=0
β$k∆e$j,t−k +
2∑
k=0
η$k∆e$j,t−k × Sj + εj,t, (A.1)
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Exchange rate pass-through into prices: Country group heterogeneity
unweighted trade-weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
E→E E→A A→E A→A E→E E→A A→E A→A
∆pij,t ∆pij,t ∆pij,t ∆pij,t ∆pij,t ∆pij,t ∆pij,t ∆pij,t
∆eij,t 0.0980*** 0.0514** 0.265*** 0.332*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.433*** 0.373***
(0.0329) (0.0225) (0.0379) (0.0195) (0.0391) (0.0269) (0.132) (0.0504)
∆e$j,t 0.858*** 0.766*** 0.710*** 0.409*** 0.820*** 0.498*** 0.608*** 0.287***
(0.0353) (0.0364) (0.0382) (0.0284) (0.0487) (0.0533) (0.122) (0.0487)
R-squared 0.470 0.152 0.530 0.142 0.572 0.252 0.467 0.264
Observations 6,763 10,589 12,318 17,150 6,763 10,589 12,318 17,150
Dyads 435 618 700 894 435 618 700 894
Table 13: “E→A”, say, denotes goods ows from Emerging to Advanced economies. e rst (resp., last) four
columns use unweighted (resp. trade-weighted) regressions as in specications (2) and (5) of Table 3. All regres-
sions include two ∆ER lags, lags 0–2 of exporter ∆PPI, and time FE. S.e. clustered by dyad. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
Trade elasticity with respect to exchange rate: Country group heterogeneity
unweighted trade-weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
E→E E→A A→E A→A E→E E→A A→E A→A
∆yij,t ∆yij,t ∆yij,t ∆yij,t ∆yij,t ∆yij,t ∆yij,t ∆yij,t
∆eij,t -0.0488 -0.0145 -0.182*** -0.0737 -0.0471 -0.0441** -0.0377 0.0228
(0.0333) (0.0212) (0.0700) (0.0481) (0.0357) (0.0225) (0.117) (0.0518)
∆e$j,t -0.163*** -0.435*** 0.00868 -0.340*** -0.208*** -0.251*** -0.0995 -0.302***
(0.0588) (0.0749) (0.0704) (0.0607) (0.0641) (0.0622) (0.118) (0.0548)
R-squared 0.093 0.049 0.100 0.082 0.237 0.301 0.218 0.214
Observations 8,239 12,967 12,932 18,134 8,239 12,967 12,932 18,134
Dyads 485 679 719 924 485 679 719 924
Table 14: “E→A”, say, denotes goods ows from Emerging to Advanced economies. e rst (resp., last) four
columns use unweighted (resp. trade-weighted) regressions as in specications (2) and (5) of Table 4. All re-
gressions include two ∆ER lags, lags 0–2 of importer ∆GDP, and time FE. S.e. clustered by dyad. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Dollar pass-through into CPI and PPI, 2002–2015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆cpij,t ∆cpij,t ∆ppij,t ∆ppij,t
∆e$j,t 0.106*** 0.0221 0.284*** 0.182***
[0.04, 0.18] [-0.05, 0.09] [0.14, 0.43] [0.05, 0.32]
∆e$j,t × Sj 0.181** 0.237*
[0.04, 0.33] [-0.03, 0.51]
R-squared 0.283 0.453 0.532 0.675
Observations 766 544 697 525
Countries 55 39 52 38
Table 15: e rst (resp., last) two columns use CPI (resp., PPI) growth as dependent variable. All regressions
include two ∆ER lags and time FE. 95% condence intervals clustered by country and corrected for small number
of clusters using “LZ2-BM” method of Imbens and Kolesa´r (2016). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (only 95% interval
shown).
where ∆cpij,t is the change in the log CPI in the currency of country j, and λj and δt are country and year xed
eects, respectively. We also consider specications with ∆ppij,t on the le-hand side, as well as specications
restricting ψk = 0 for all k. We focus aention on the post-2002 (post-euro) sample, since full-sample regression
results are unduly inuenced by a handful of countries’ high-ination/high-depreciation episodes in the 1990s.27
Table 15 displays the contemporaneous dollar pass-through into CPI and PPI. e rst two columns shows
results for CPI pass-through, and the second two show those for PPI pass-through. Columns (1) and (3) do not
interact exchange rate changes with the dollar invoicing share, while columns (2) and (4) do. e table displays
95% condence intervals rather than standard errors because the small number of countries (clusters) necessi-
tates the use of small-sample corrections (Imbens and Kolesa´r, 2016). e average pass-through of the dollar into
CPI (resp., PPI) is 11% (resp., 28%) within the year. e dollar pass-through is larger for countries that have a sub-
stantial fraction of imports invoiced in dollars. e contemporaneous interaction term is statistically signicant
at the 10% level for both the CPI and PPI specications, and also at the 5% level for the CPI specication. Hence,
it appears that countries which invoice more in dollars experience higher dollar pass-through into consumer
and producer prices. We caution, though, that the magnitude of the pass-through is imprecisely estimated when
controlling for country and time xed eects.
A.2.3 e Dollar Versus the Euro
We now compare the explanatory power of the dollar exchange rate with that of the euro. We show that the
dollar dominates both the bilateral exchange rate and the euro in regression specications that include all three
exchange rates.
e panel regressions in Section 3 do not directly imply that the U.S. dollar is a uniquely important vehicle
currency. In our regression specications without interactions, we would have obtained exactly the same coe-
cient estimates if we had used the euro exchange rate, say, in place of the dollar exchange rate, since we control
for time xed eects.28 Nevertheless, our specications with interactions indicated that the dollar plays a special
27e results are very similar if we use the full 1992–2015 sample but drop country-year observations for which the
arithmetic CPI ination rate exceeds 30% annually (0.26 log ination rate).
28To see this formally, note that one can rewrite the (log) change in the euro exchange rate as ∆eej,t = ∆ee$,t + ∆e$j,t
and the rst term is absorbed by the time xed eects.
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role. Now we directly compare the explanatory power of the dollar against that of the euro in panel regressions
that do not control for time xed eects but instead control for observed global real and nancial variables.
To measure bilateral price pass-through from the dollar and the euro, we run panel regressions of the form
∆pij,t = λij +
2∑
k=0
βk∆eij,t−k +
2∑
k=0
β$k∆e$j,t−k +
2∑
k=0
βek∆eej,t−k + θ
′Xij,t + εij,t, (A.2)
where eej,t denotes the log euro exchange rate in units of currency j per euro. Notice that we omit time xed
eects, as is necessary to identify β$k and βek separately. In addition to lags 0–2 of exporter PPI log growth, the
controls Xij,t consist of the contemporaneous values of global real GDP growth, global GDP deator ination,
global export volume growth, growth in the WTI oil price deated by the global GDP deator, and the log VIX.
e time sample for regressions in this subsection is 2002–2015 due to the introduction of the euro in 1999 and
our use of lagged exchange rate changes.
Fig. 16 shows that the euro pass-through into prices is negligible on average, while the dollar pass-through
remains high when we control for the euro. e gure displays the regression results in the form of impulse
responses of the bilateral price level; corresponding regression tables are available in online appendix A.2.5.
Similarly, the dollar exchange rate has the largest predictive power for trade volumes. We run panel regres-
sions similar to Eq. (A.2), except with volume growth ∆yij,t on the le-hand side, and we replace exporter PPI
with lags 0–2 of importer real GDP growth in the list of controls Xij,t. Fig. 17 shows impulse responses of the
level of bilateral trade volume to the bilateral, dollar, and euro exchange rates. e dollar exchange rate is the
only one of the three that has a quantitatively large negative association with trade volumes.29
Tables 16 and 17 display the euro regression results in table form. Specications (1) and (4) focus on the
bilateral and euro exchange rates, specications (2) and (5) add the dollar exchange rate, and specications (3)
and (6) include interactions with the dollar and euro import invoicing shares. Sej is the importing country’s share
of imports invoiced in euros from Gopinath (2015). e interactions are statistically and economically signicant
and mostly have the expected signs in the price pass-through regressions: A higher share of euro (resp., dollar)
invoicing implies a higher pass-through from the euro (resp., dollar) exchange rate.
A.2.4 Trade Elasticity of Dollar Versus Other Major Currencies
e large negative predictive eect of a uniform dollar appreciation on world trade documented in Section 3.6
is robust to controlling for other major exchange rates. Table 18 shows trade elasticity regressions as in Eq. (22),
except that we drop interaction terms but add the exchange rates of the importer versus the Swiss franc and
versus the Japanese yen. We drop interaction terms here because we do not have extensive data on the currency
invoicing shares of the franc and the yen. e rst and third columns in the table show the contemporaneous
trade elasticity coecients of the bilateral, dollar, and euro exchange rates, without controlling for the franc
and the yen exchange rates. e second and fourth columns then add the franc and the yen exchange rates.
e sample is the post-euro period of 2002–2015. Evidently, adding the franc and the yen exchange rates as
controls does nothing to diminish the large negative eect of the dollar on bilateral trade volumes. In fact,
the trade-weighted specication exhibits an even more negative dollar elasticity when the franc and the yen are
added as controls, although the standard error on the dollar coecient is substantially larger in this specication
(the coecient remains highly signicant). Moreover, according to the regression results, it is only a uniform
U.S. dollar appreciation that has a large negative eect on world trade, whereas uniform appreciations of the
other major currencies do not predict substantial drops in trade volumes. Finally, note that the R-squared of the
regression hardly increases when the franc and yen are added as controls.
A.2.5 Regression Details and Robustness Checks
Post-2002 results. Exchange rate pass-through into prices has been stable over our sample period, while
trade elasticities may have become larger in absolute value in the laer part of the sample. We compute results
29e dierent long-run level eect of the dollar in Figs. 6 and 17 is due to the dierence in time sample, as discussed in
online appendix A.2.5.
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Price pass-through from dollar and euro exchange rates
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Figure 16: Impulse responses of bilateral price level to bilateral eij,t, USD e$j,t, and euro eej,t exchange rates.
Based on regressions in Table 16, on-line appendix A.2.5. Top row: unweighted regression, boom row: trade-
weighted. Le column: specications with only bilateral and euro ER, right column: specications adding USD.
Error bars: 95% condence intervals, clustering by dyad.
Trade elasticity for dollar and euro exchange rates
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Figure 17: Impulse responses of bilateral volume to bilateral eij,t, USD e$j,t, and euro eej,t exchange rates. Based
on regressions in Table 17, on-line appendix A.2.5. Top row: unweighted regression, boom row: trade-weighted.
Le column: specications with bilateral and euro ER, right column: specications adding USD. Error bars: 95%
condence intervals, clustering by dyad.
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Euro vs. dollar exchange rate pass-through into prices
unweighted trade-weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆pij,t ∆pij,t ∆pij,t ∆pij,t ∆pij,t ∆pij,t
∆eij,t 0.305*** 0.181*** 0.207*** 0.438*** 0.331*** 0.551***
(0.0159) (0.0174) (0.0695) (0.0490) (0.0567) (0.156)
∆eij,t × (Sj + Sej ) -0.0357 -0.361**
(0.0784) (0.174)
∆e$j,t 0.754*** 0.614*** 0.561*** 0.379***
(0.0373) (0.0405) (0.0755) (0.0672)
∆e$j,t × Sj 0.510*** 0.769***
(0.0439) (0.151)
∆eej,t 0.467*** -0.0800** -0.347*** 0.207*** -0.184*** -0.384***
(0.0175) (0.0332) (0.0430) (0.0612) (0.0601) (0.0726)
∆eej,t × Sej 0.694*** 0.709***
(0.0821) (0.122)
R-squared 0.131 0.143 0.210 0.102 0.112 0.293
Observations 33,802 33,802 24,463 33,802 33,802 24,463
Dyads 2,647 2,647 1,900 2,647 2,647 1,900
Table 16: e rst (resp., last) three columns use unweighted (resp. trade-weighted) regressions. All regressions
include two ∆ER lags, lags 0–2 of exporter ∆PPI, and global controls as described in the text. S.e. clustered by
dyad. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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for the subsample 2002–2015, roughly corresponding to the second half of our data set, and also corresponding
to the sample used for the euro regressions in Section A.2.3. Figures 18 and 19 show price and volume impulse
responses for the 2002–2015 subsample that correspond to the full-sample results in Figures 4 and 6 in Section
3. e price pass-through impulse responses of bilateral and dollar exchange rates are similar to the full-sample
results. However, the post-2002 USD cumulative trade elasticity (unweighted) is substantially negative at lags of
1 and 2 years, whereas the level eect is close to zero at lags 1 and 2 on the full sample.
Pre-2007 results. Our headline results are not driven by the global nancial crisis starting in 2008. Figures
20 and 21 show the average exchange rate pass-through and trade elasticity computed on the 1992–2007 sample.
e results are almost identical to our baseline Figures 4 and 6. Figure 22 shows the eect of rest-of-world trade
of a uniform USD appreciation, using only 2002–2007 data. Here the results are even stronger than in the baseline
Figure 8.
Weighted average dollar invoicing share. Figure 23 depicts the weighted average dollar import invoic-
ing share
∑
j 6=US wjSj used in Section 3.6, where the ex-U.S. non-commodity import value weights wj have
been computed for each year in our sample. Notice that the weighted average uctuates tightly around a mean
of 0.40.
Additional controls. Table 19 shows that our pass-through regressions results are qualitatively robust to
adding importer PPI growth and importer real GDP growth as additional controls. We use two lags of the log
changes of each of these indices. Although our baseline specication in Section 3.3 is common in the literature,
the addition of importer PPI and GDP controls can be justied by models with strategic complementarity in
pricing and country-specic demand shis. While the overall level of both bilateral and USD pass-through is
somewhat lower when the controls are added, our qualitative conclusions regarding the dominance of the USD
exchange rate and the relationship with dollar invoicing are as pronounced in Table 19 as in Table 3.
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Average price pass-through, 2002–2015
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Figure 18: Figure 4 computed on post-2002 data, but with same weights.
Average trade elasticity, 2002–2015
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Figure 19: Figure 6 computed on post-2002 data, but with same weights.
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Average price pass-through, 1992–2007
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Figure 20: Figure 4 computed on pre-2007 data, but with same weights.
Average trade elasticity, 1992–2007
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Figure 21: Figure 6 computed on pre-2007 data, but with same weights.
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Euro vs. dollar trade elasticity
unweighted trade-weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆yij,t ∆yij,t ∆yij,t ∆yij,t
∆eij,t -0.0631* 0.0229 -0.146*** -0.0560
(0.0371) (0.0386) (0.0493) (0.0429)
∆e$j,t -0.695*** -0.573***
(0.0806) (0.124)
∆eej,t -0.179*** 0.320*** -0.00647 0.386***
(0.0413) (0.0759) (0.0494) (0.105)
R-squared 0.068 0.071 0.197 0.203
Observations 37,437 37,437 37,437 37,437
Dyads 2,807 2,807 2,807 2,807
Table 17: e rst (resp., last) two columns use unweighted (resp. trade-weighted) regressions. All regressions
include two ∆ER lags, lags 0–2 of importer ∆GDP, and global controls as described in the text. S.e. clustered by
dyad. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Response of rest-of-world aggregate trade to USD appreciation, 2002–2007
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Figure 22: Figure 8 computed on pre-2007 data, but with same weights.
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Trade elasticity for dollar and other major currencies
unweighted trade-weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆yij,t ∆yij,t ∆yij,t ∆yij,t
∆eij,t 0.0177 0.0215 -0.0595 -0.0566
(0.0385) (0.0387) (0.0422) (0.0424)
∆e$j,t -0.765*** -0.880*** -0.719*** -1.988***
(0.0805) (0.287) (0.0795) (0.566)
∆eej,t 0.393*** 0.331* 0.529*** 1.146***
(0.0755) (0.191) (0.0856) (0.349)
∆eCHFj,t -0.0277 -0.127
(0.134) (0.169)
∆eYENj,t 0.203 0.786*
(0.195) (0.418)
R-squared 0.070 0.071 0.200 0.206
Observations 37,437 37,437 37,437 37,437
Dyads 2,807 2,807 2,807 2,807
Table 18: eCHFj,t and eYENj,t denote the log price of the Swiss franc and Japanese yen, resp., in the importer’s
currency. e rst (resp., last) two columns use unweighted (resp., trade-weighted) regressions. All regressions
include two ∆ER lags, lags 0–2 of importer ∆GDP, and the same global controls as in Appendix A.2.3. S.e.
clustered by dyad. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Weighted average dollar invoicing share over time
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Figure 23: Weighted average dollar import invoicing share
∑
j 6=US wjSj , using import value weights wj com-
puted in dierent reference years (along horizontal axis). Horizontal lines show the mean on the 1992–2015 and
2002–2015 samples.
Exchange rate pass-through into prices: Additional controls
unweighted trade-weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆pij,t ∆pij,t ∆pij,t ∆pij,t ∆pij,t ∆pij,t
∆eij,t 0.519*** 0.163*** 0.214*** 0.550*** 0.328*** 0.456***
(0.0117) (0.0133) (0.0177) (0.0471) (0.0480) (0.0352)
∆eij,t × Sj -0.0869*** -0.272***
(0.0252) (0.0495)
∆e$j,t 0.706*** 0.524*** 0.464*** 0.103
(0.0183) (0.0298) (0.0347) (0.0639)
∆e$j,t × Sj 0.303*** 0.643***
(0.0360) (0.0951)
R-squared 0.388 0.411 0.528 0.361 0.382 0.650
Observations 42,243 42,243 32,916 42,243 42,243 32,916
Dyads 2,502 2,502 1,853 2,502 2,502 1,853
Table 19: e rst (resp., last) three columns use unweighted (resp. trade-weighted) regressions. All regressions
include two ∆ER lags, lags 0–2 of exporter ∆PPI, lags 0–2 of importer ∆PPI, lags 0–2 of importer ∆GDP, and
time FE. S.e. clustered by dyad. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A.3 Firm level data for Colombia
e data are from the customs agency (DIAN), and the department of statistics (DANE), and include information
on the universe of Colombian importers and exporters. We have access to the data through the Banco de la
Repu´blica. e data include the trading rm’s tax identication number, the 10-digit product code (according to
the Nandina classication system, based on the Harmonized System), the FOB value (in U.S. dollars) and volume
(net kilograms) of exports (imports), and the country of destination (origin), among other details.30 e data are
available on a monthly basis, and for our analysis we aggregate exports and imports at the annual or quarterly
level. As in Section 3, macroeconomic country controls are from the World Development Indicators. Our esti-
mations cover the period between 2005 and 2015. We dene prices and quantities at the rm,10-digit product,
country (origin or destination), year (or quarter) level. Prices are given by the FOB value per net kilogram, and
quantities are given by total net kilograms. Exchange rates are the annual or quarterly average.
Further, starting in 2007, our exports data include information on the invoicing currency of each transaction.
In Table 20 we present the distribution of currencies, broken down by destination groups. It is evident that the
vast majority of Colombian exports are priced in dollars. Even for exports to the euro zone, the overwhelm-
ing invoicing currency is the dollar. Although some transactions are negotiated in euros, Colombian pesos, or
Venezuelan bolı´vares among other currencies, the U.S. dollar accounts for over 98% of all exports. Moreover, the
distribution is very similar if we look at the value of exports negotiated in each currency instead of the number
of transactions. In this regard the Colombian economy is representative of a large number of economies that
rely extensively on dollar invoicing.
30In the case of imports, there are cases where the imported good was produced in one country but actually arrived to
Colombia from a third country. is case is most commonly seen for goods produced in China arriving to Colombia from
either the United States or Panama. To avoid introducing unnecessary noise in our empirical work, we only use for our
regressions those observations where the country of origin and purchase are the same.
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Currency distribution by destination
Destination Currency All Exports Manufactures
US
US Dollar 99.71% 99.93%
Euro 0.02% 0.03%
Colombian Peso 0.27% 0.03%
Dollar economies
US Dollar 99.73% 99.91%
Euro 0.03% 0.04%
Colombian Peso 0.23% 0.03%
CAN
US Dollar 99.75% 99.90%
Euro 0.07% 0.07%
Colombian Peso 0.18% 0.03%
Latin America
US Dollar 99.18% 99.34%
Euro 0.13% 0.13%
Colombian Peso 0.22% 0.03%
Bolı´var (Ven) 0.44% 0.45%
Mexican Peso 0.02% 0.02%
Colo´n (CR) 0.01% 0.01%
European Union
US Dollar 90.73% 86.19%
Euro 8.64% 13.28%
Colombian Peso 0.31% 0.21%
Sterling Pound 0.28% 0.26%
Euro zone
US Dollar 88.78% 84.48%
Euro 10.80% 15.22%
Colombian Peso 0.39% 0.25%
Sterling Pound 0.01% 0.01%
All destinations
US Dollar 98.28% 98.39%
Euro 0.72% 0.70%
Colombian Peso 0.67% 0.52%
Venezuelan Bolı´var 0.27% 0.33%
Sterling Pound 0.02% 0.01%
Table 20: Data from DIAN/DANE. Exports of coke, rened petroleum products, and nuclear fuel (ISIC 23), and
basic metals (ISIC 27) excluded from “Manufactures”. Distribution calculated as number of invoices in each
currency.
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Exchange rate pass-through into prices, annual data (dollarized economies)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆pH,t ∆pH,t ∆pH,t ∆pH,t ∆pH,t ∆pH,t
Exports
∆e$H,t 0.696*** 0.828*** 0.859*** 0.823*** 0.798*** 0.819***
(0.0331) (0.0355) (0.0414) (0.0373) (0.0450) (0.0606)
PPI no yes yes yes yes yes
Euro ER no no yes no no yes
∆ER lags no no no yes no no
Sample M M M M D D
R-squared 0.288 0.290 0.290 0.290 0.303 0.303
Observations 169,792 159,041 159,041 159,041 98,831 98,831
Imports
∆e$H,t 0.977*** 1.007*** 1.035*** 1.016*** 0.969*** 0.971***
(0.0177) (0.0309) (0.0430) (0.0192) (0.0352) (0.0357)
PPI no yes yes yes yes yes
Euro ER no no yes no no yes
∆ER lags no no no yes no no
Sample M M M M D D
R-squared 0.225 0.225 0.225 0.225 0.250 0.250
Observations 529,584 529,260 529,260 529,260 275,968 275,968
Table 21: All regressions include Firm-Industry-Country xed eects. S.e. clustered at the year level. e
sample includes all manufactured (M) products excluding petrochemicals and metal industries in columns (1)-(4)
and only dierentiated (D) products in columns (5)-(6). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
A.4 Micro Regressions: Supplementary Results
is section provides supplementary regression results using the Colombian rm-level data, including robustness
checks.
Tables 21-24 display the results of the price pass-through and trade elasticity regressions presented in Sec-
tion 4.1, including PPI, the peso/euro exchange rate, and two ∆ER annual lags as additional controls. All re-
gressions include Firm-Industry-Country xed eects. Our pass-through regressions results are robust to the
inclusion of these controls, and qualitative results are unchanged when we use the subsample of dierentiated
products only (instead of the full set of manufactures) constructed using the classication of goods by Rauch
(1999).31
31In our reported estimates, we follow Rauch’s conservative classication, although the results are virtually unchanged
if we use the liberal denition instead.
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Exchange rate pass-through into prices, annual data (non-dollarized economies)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆pH,t ∆pH,t ∆pH,t ∆pH,t ∆pH,t ∆pH,t ∆pH,t ∆pH,t
Exports
∆eiH,t 0.673*** 0.0616 0.523*** 0.0726 0.0737 0.0576 0.0634 0.0510
(0.0937) (0.0474) (0.120) (0.0452) (0.0510) (0.0370) (0.0832) (0.115)
∆e$H,t 0.667*** 0.633*** 0.672*** 0.652*** 0.644*** 0.655***
(0.0507) (0.0602) (0.0667) (0.0603) (0.0860) (0.104)
PPI no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Euro ER no no no no yes no no yes
∆ER lags no no no no no yes no no
Sample M M M M M M D D
R-squared 0.303 0.305 0.308 0.310 0.300 0.310 0.324 0.315
Observations 206,226 206,226 139,318 139,318 120,316 139,318 85,659 74,090
Imports
∆eiH,t 0.750*** 0.315*** 0.506*** 0.275*** 0.238** 0.255*** 0.293** 0.248**
(0.116) (0.0777) (0.127) (0.0837) (0.0889) (0.0777) (0.103) (0.0954)
∆e$H,t 0.528*** 0.534*** 0.607*** 0.572*** 0.535*** 0.601***
(0.0650) (0.0510) (0.0707) (0.0365) (0.0647) (0.0822)
PPI no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Euro ER no no no no yes no no yes
∆ER lags no no no no no yes no no
Sample M M M M M M D D
R-squared 0.287 0.290 0.291 0.293 0.320 0.293 0.312 0.337
Observations 931,993 931,993 808,304 808,304 518,898 808,304 419,717 272,060
Table 22: All regressions include Firm-Industry-Country xed eects. S.e. clustered at the year level. e
sample includes all manufactured (M) products excluding petrochemicals and metal industries in columns (1)-(6)
and only dierentiated (D) products in columns (7)-(8). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Trade elasticity with respect to exchange rate, annual data (dollarized economies)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆yH,t ∆yH,t ∆yH,t ∆yH,t ∆yH,t
Exports
∆e$H,t -0.580* -0.425 -0.559 -0.406 -0.00635
(0.294) (0.370) (0.368) (0.353) (0.404)
Euro ER no yes no no yes
∆ER lags no no yes no no
Sample M M M D D
R-squared 0.225 0.225 0.225 0.232 0.232
Observations 159,041 159,041 159,041 98,831 98,831
Imports
∆e$H,t -1.206*** -0.959** -1.205** -1.235*** -0.973*
(0.282) (0.407) (0.466) (0.325) (0.468)
Euro ER no yes no no yes
∆ER lags no no yes no no
Sample M M M D D
R-squared 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.205 0.205
Observations 529,276 529,276 529,276 275,974 275,974
Table 23: All regressions control for PPI, importer GDP, and include Firm-Industry-Country xed eects. S.e.
clustered at the year level. e sample includes all manufactured (M) products excluding petrochemicals and
metal industries in columns (1)-(3) and only dierentiated (D) products in columns (4)-(5). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Trade elasticity with respect to exchange rate, annual data (non-dollarized economies)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆yH,t ∆yH,t ∆yH,t ∆yH,t ∆yH,t ∆yH,t ∆yH,t
Exports
∆eiH,t -0.763*** 0.0193 -0.0553 -0.0330 -0.992*** -0.136 -0.200
(0.212) (0.260) (0.314) (0.271) (0.261) (0.333) (0.390)
∆e$H,t -1.077*** -1.007** -1.032*** -1.152*** -0.977**
(0.265) (0.322) (0.265) (0.282) (0.342)
Euro ER no no yes no no no yes
∆ER lags no no no yes no no no
Sample M M M M D D D
R-squared 0.250 0.252 0.245 0.252 0.258 0.260 0.252
Observations 139,318 139,318 120,316 139,318 85,659 85,659 74,090
Imports
∆eiH,t -0.703*** -0.212* -0.319 -0.204 -0.763*** -0.223 -0.314
(0.217) (0.110) (0.246) (0.114) (0.241) (0.129) (0.251)
∆e$H,t -0.962*** -0.922*** -0.941*** -1.023*** -0.957***
(0.224) (0.245) (0.250) (0.281) (0.277)
Euro ER no no yes no no no yes
∆ER lags no no no yes no no no
Sample M M M M D D D
R-squared 0.236 0.237 0.254 0.237 0.263 0.264 0.286
Observations 808,409 808,409 519,002 808,409 419,784 419,784 272,126
Table 24: All regressions control for PPI, importer GDP, and include Firm-Industry-Country xed eects. S.e.
clustered at the year level. e sample includes all manufactured (M) products excluding petrochemicals and
metal industries in columns (1)-(4) and only dierentiated (D) products in columns (5)-(7). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Parameter values
Parameter Value
Measured
Export Invoicing Shares
to U.S. θ$H$ 1.00
to R θ$HR, θRHR 0.93,0.07
Shocks
commodity prices σζ , ρζ 0.09, 0.74
Estimated
Home bias γHH 0.88
from U.S. γ$H 0.06
from R γRH 0.06
Exports
to U.S. D$ -2.38
to R DR -0.87
Oil endowment ζ¯ 0.27
Import Invoicing Shares
from U.S. θ$$H 1.00
from R θ$RH , θRRH 0.93, 0.07
eRH process η, ρR, σR 0.74, 0.82,0.016
a process σa, ρa, ρa,ζ 0.13,0.49,-0.18
Table 25: Other parameter values as reported in the text.
A.5 Structural Estimation On Colombian Data
We use a combination of calibration and estimation to parameterize the model, reported in Table 25 while other
parameter values are as reported in Table 1. e export invoicing shares are measured in the data directly. We
calibrate the process for commodity price shocks in equation (24) to match the autocorrelation and standard
deviation of HP-ltered commodity prices.32 e values for ζ¯ , D$, DR, γHH , are chosen such that in steady
state the model matches the Colombian data for the share of oil exports in total exports of 58%, a 10% share of
oil exports over GDP, and the share of manufacturing exports going to the U.S. of 18%. We also match a steady
state debt to GDP of 31% for Colombia. We set the interest elasticity to real dollar debt to equal 0.001.
We estimate the remaining parameters using a minimum distance estimator that minimizes the sum of
squared deviations from moments in the data. Specically, we minimize,
m(~τ)Ω−1mT(~τ)
where ~τ = {θ$$H , θ$RH , θRRH , η, σr, ρR, σa, ρa, ρa,ζ} is a vector of nine parameters. To estimate these parameters
we use the following eleven moments m(~τ) that theory suggests are informative. We estimate all parameters
jointly and consequently all moments maer for all parameter values. e most informative moment for each
parameter is described next.
32Specically, we use the IMF’s price index for all primary commodities, at the quarterly frequency, from 2000Q1 to
2016Q2. We HP lter the log of the index and compute the autocorrelation and the standard deviation of the cyclical
component.
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Moment matching
βˆ$0,$H βˆ
$
0,RH βˆ
H
0,RH ηˆ σˆR ρˆR ρˆa,ζ σˆa ρˆa βˆ
$
0,HR βˆ
$
0,RH
Data 0.97 0.89 0.18 0.54 0.018 0.78 0.84 0.023 0.64 0.85 0.87
Model 0.97 0.80 0.13 0.54 0.017 0.78 0.87 0.026 0.64 0.81 0.90
Table 26: Moments in the data and in the estimated model. e dierence between the second and last column is
that the former estimate is from a regression that controls for the bilateral ER alongside the dollar ER. e laer
is from a regression with only the dollar ER.
• Import Invoicing Shares: To estimate the import invoicing shares,
– θ$$H : We use the contemporaneous estimate β0 from the pass-through regression for import prices
from dollar countries.
– θRRH and θ$RH : We use the coecients from regressing the quarterly change in import prices from
non-dollar destinations on the peso/dollar and peso/origin country exchange rates.33 ∆pRH,t =
β$ ·∆e$H,t + βR ·∆eRH,t + t
• Relation between eRH and e$H : To estimate η and σR we construct the real exchange rate for Colombia
relative to the U.S. and the (export share weighted) real exchange rate for Colombia relative to its other
trading partners. We use these series to estimate the two equations (23) and (26) which we rewrite here:
eRH,t + pR,t − pH,t = η
(
e$H,t + p$,t − pH,t
)
+ εR,t
εR,t = ρRεR,t−1 + R,t
We use the empirical estimate for ηˆ, ρˆR and the standard deviation of R,t to obtain η, ρR, σR.
• Process for a and ζ : We match moments for the standard deviation (0.023) and autocorrelation (0.62) of
manufacturing value added. We also match the contemporaneous correlation (0.84) of value added and
commodity prices. Note that a refers to productivity, so we infer the process for a from matching moments
of value added in the model and data.
• Additional Moments: We match the time zero coecient on pass-through from E$H into export and import
prices for R goods.
e weighting matrix Ω−1 is a diagonal matrix where the entries are the inverse of the variance of the data
moments. e estimated values from this minimization are reported in Table 25 and the moment match between
the model and data are reported in Table 26. As Table 25 reports the data strongly points towards DCP with
almost all of the import invoicing share in dollars.
33In the data we also control for the peso/euro exchange rate.
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Exchange rate pass-through into prices: Data and estimated model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆pHR,t ∆pHR,t ∆pRH,t ∆pRH,t
Data
∆eRH,t 0.67*** 0.06 0.750*** 0.32***
(0.09) (0.05) (0.12) (0.08)
∆e$H,t 0.68*** 0.53***
(0.05) (0.07)
Estimated model
∆eRH,t 0.72 0.28 0.68 0.22
∆e$H,t 0.66 0.70
DCP
∆eRH,t 0.71 0.23 0.67 0.17
∆e$H,t 0.71 0.75
PCP
∆eRH,t 0.49 0.26 0.92 0.88
∆e$H,t 0.36 0.06
LCP
∆eRH,t 0.98 0.93 0.44 0.19
∆e$H,t 0.08 0.39
Table 27: Exchange rate pass-through into export and import prices to/from non-dollarized economies, in the
data and the model. Both regressions have only the bilateral exchange rate and the dollar exchange rate as
controls. Data regressions include Firm-Industry-Country xed eects, with s.e. clustered at the year level.
e last three sets of results show the model-implied pass-through coecients for the three extreme pricing
assumptions, keeping all other parameters xed at the values in Table 26.
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